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ABSTRACT
Differential privacy (DP) has steadily become the de-facto
standard for achieving privacy in data analysis, which is typ-
ically implemented either in the “central” or “local” model.
The local model has been more popular for commercial de-
ployments as it does not require a trusted data collector. This
increased privacy, however, comes at a cost of utility and
algorithmic expressibility as compared to the central model.
In this work, we propose, Cryptϵ , a system and program-
ming framework that (1) achieves the accuracy guarantees
and algorithmic expressibility of the central model (2) with-
out any trusted data collector like in the local model. Cryptϵ
achieves the “best of both worlds” by employing two non-
colluding untrusted servers that run DP programs on en-
crypted data from the data owners. Although straightforward
implementations of DP programs using secure computation
tools can achieve the above goal theoretically, in practice
they are beset with many challenges such as poor perfor-
mance and tricky security proofs. To this end, Cryptϵ allows
data analysts to author logical DP programs that are automat-
ically translated to secure protocols that work on encrypted
data. These protocols ensure that the untrusted servers learn
nothing more than the noisy outputs, thereby guaranteeing
DP (for computationally bounded adversaries) for all Cryptϵ
programs. Cryptϵ supports a rich class of DP programs that
can be expressed via a small set of transformation and mea-
surement operators followed by arbitrary post-processing.
Further, we propose performance optimizations leveraging
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the fact that the output is noisy. We demonstrate Cryptϵ’s
feasibility for practical DP analysis with extensive empirical
evaluations on real datasets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous privacy definition that
has become the gold standard for data privacy. It is typically
implemented in one of two models – centralized differential
privacy (CDP) and local differential privacy (LDP). In CDP,
data from individuals are collected and stored in the clear in
a trusted centralized data curator which then executes DP
programs on the sensitive data and releases outputs to an
untrustworthy data analyst. In LDP, there is no trusted data
curator. Rather, each individual perturbs his/her own data
using a (local) DP algorithm. The data analyst uses these
noisy data to infer aggregate statistics of the datasets. In
practice, CDP’s assumption of a trusted server is ill-suited
for many applications as it constitutes a single point of fail-
ure for data breaches, and saddles the trusted curator with
legal and ethical obligations to uphold data privacy. Hence
recent commercial deployments of DP [42, 51] have preferred
LDP over CDP. However, LDP’s attractive privacy properties
comes at a cost. Under the CDPmodel, the expected additive
error for a aggregate count over a dataset of size n is at most
Θ(1/ϵ) to achieve ϵ-DP. In contrast, under the LDPmodel, at
least Ω(√n/ϵ) additive expected error must be incurred by
any ϵ-DP program [16, 28, 36], owing to the randomness of
each data owner. The LDP model in fact imposes additional
penalties on the algorithmic expressibility; the power of LDP
is equivalent to that of the statistical query model [66] and
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there exists an exponential separation between the accuracy
and sample complexity of LDP and CDP algorithms [64].
In this paper, we strive to bridge the gap between LDP
and CDP. We propose, Cryptϵ , a system and a programming
framework for executing DP programs that:
• never stores or computes on sensitive data in the clear
• achieves the accuracy guarantees and algorithmic express-
ibility of the CDP model
Cryptϵ employs a pair of untrusted but non-colluding servers
– Analytics Server (AS) and Cryptographic Service Provider
(CSP). The AS executes DP programs (like the data curator
in CDP) but on encrypted data records. The CSP initializes
and manages the cryptographic primitives, and collaborates
with the AS to generate the program outputs. Under the as-
sumption that the AS and the CSP are semi-honest and do
not collude (a common assumption in cryptographic systems
[45, 46, 48, 67, 80, 83, 84]), Cryptϵ ensures ϵ-DP guarantee for
its programs via two cryptographic primitives – linear homo-
morphic encryption (LHE) and garbled circuits. One caveat
here is that due to the usage of cryptographic primitives, the
DP guarantee obtained in Cryptϵ is that of computational
differential privacy or SIM-CDP [79] (details in Section 7).
Cryptϵ provides a data analyst with a programming frame-
work to author logical DP programs just like in CDP. Like
in prior work [40, 77, 106], access to the sensitive data is
restricted via a set of predefined transformations operators
(inspired by relational algebra) and DP measurement oper-
ators (Laplace mechanism and Noisy-Max [38]). Thus, any
program that can be expressed as a composition of the above
operators automatically satisfies ϵ-DP (inCDPmodel) giving
the analyst a proof of privacy for free. Cryptϵ programs sup-
port constructs like looping, conditionals, and can arbitrarily
post-process outputs of measurement operators.
The main contributions of this work are:
• New Approach: We present the design and implementa-
tion of Cryptϵ , a novel system and programming frame-
work for executing DP programs over encrypted data on
two non-colluding untrusted servers.
• Algorithm Expressibility: Cryptϵ supports a rich class
of state-of -the-art DP programs expressed in terms of a
small set of transformation and measurement operators.
Thus, Cryptϵ achieves the accuracy guarantees of theCDP
model without the need for a trusted curator.
• Ease Of Use: Cryptϵ lets data analysts express the DP
program logic using high level operators. Cryptϵ automat-
ically translates this to the underlying implementation
specific secure protocols that work on encrypted data and
provides a DP guarantee (in the CDPmodel) for free. Thus
the data analyst is relieved of concerns regarding key man-
agement and implementing secure computation protocols.
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Figure 1: Cryptϵ System
• PerformanceOptimizations:We propose optimizations
that speed up computation on encrypted data by at least an
order of magnitude. A novel contribution of this work is a
DP indexing optimization that leverages the fact that noisy
intermediate statistics about the data can be revealed.
• Practical for Real World Usage: For the same tasks,
Cryptϵ programs achieve accuracy comparable to CDP
and 50× more accurate than that of LDP for a dataset of
size 30K . Cryptϵ runs within 3.6 hours for a large class of
programs on a dataset with 1 million rows and 4 attributes.
• GeneralizedMultiplicationUsingLHE: Our implemen-
tation uses an efficient way for performing n-way multipli-
cations using LHE which maybe of independent interest.
2 CRYPTϵ OVERVIEW
2.1 System Architecture
Figure 1 shows Cryptϵ’s system architecture. Cryptϵ has
two servers: Analytics server (AS) and Cryptographic Ser-
vice Provider (CSP). At the very outset, the CSP records
the total privacy budget, ϵB , (provided by the data owners)
and generates the key pair (pk, sk) (details in Section 3) for
the encryption scheme. The data owners, DOi , i ∈ [m] (m =
number of data owners), encrypt their data records, Di , in
the appropriate format with the public key (pk) and send
the encrypted records, D˜i , to the AS which aggregates them
into a single encrypted database D˜. Next, the AS inputs log-
ical programs from the data analysts and translates them to
Cryptϵ ’s implementation specific secure protocols that work
on D˜. A Cryptϵ program typically consists of a sequence
of transformation operators followed by a measurement op-
erator. The AS can execute most of the transformations on
its own. However, each measurement operator requires an
interaction with the CSP for (a) decrypting the answer, and
(b) checking that the total privacy budget, ϵB , is not exceeded.
In this way, the AS and the CSP compute the output of a
Cryptϵ program with the data owners being offline.
2
2.2 Cryptϵ Design Principles
Minimal Trust Assumptions: As mentioned above, the
overarching goal of Cryptϵ is to mimic the CDP model but
without a trusted server. A natural solution for dispensing
with the trust assumption of the CDP model is via crypto-
graphic primitives [9, 14, 17, 20, 29, 31, 37, 41, 92, 93]. Hence,
to accommodate the use of cryptographic primitives, we as-
sume a computationally bounded adversary in Cryptϵ . How-
ever, a genericm + 1 party SMC would be computationally
expensive. This necessitates a third party entity that can
capture the requisite secure computation functionality in (at
least) a 2-party protocol instead. This role is fulfilled by the
CSP in Cryptϵ . For this two-server model, we assume semi-
honest behaviour and non-collusion. This is a very common
assumption in the two-server model [45, 46, 48, 67, 80, 83, 84].
Programming Framework: Conceptually, the aforemen-
tioned goal of achieving the best of both worlds can be ob-
tained by implementing the required DP program using off-
the-self secure multi-party computation (SMC) tools like
[2–5]. However, when it comes to real world usage, Cryptϵ
outperforms such approaches due to the following reasons.
First, without the support of a programming framework
like that of Cryptϵ , every DP program must be implemented
from scratch. This requires the data analyst to be well versed
in both DP and SMC techniques; he/she must know how to
implement SMC protocols, estimate sensitivity of transforma-
tions and track privacy budget across programs. In contrast,
Cryptϵ allows data analysts to write the DP program using a
high-level and expressive programming framework. Cryptϵ
abstracts out all the low-level implementation details like
the choice of input data format, translation of queries to that
format, choice of SMC primitives and privacy budget mon-
itoring from the analyst thereby reducing his/her burden
of complex decision making. Thus every Cryptϵ program is
automatically translated to protocols corresponding to the
underlying implementation.
Second, SMC protocols can be prohibitively costly in prac-
tice unless they are carefully tuned to the application. Cryptϵ
supports optimized implementations for a small set of oper-
ators, which results in efficiency for all Cryptϵ programs.
Third, a DP program can be typically divided into seg-
ments that (i) transform the private data, (ii) perform noisy
measurements, and (iii) post-process the noisy measure-
ments without touching the private data. A naive implemen-
tation may implement all the steps using SMC protocols even
though post-processing can be performed in the clear. Given
a DP programwritten in a general purpose programming lan-
guage (like Python), automatically figuring out what can be
done in the clear can be subtle. In Cryptϵ programs, however,
transformation, measurement are clearly delineated, as the
data can be accessed only through a prespecified set of oper-
ators. Thus, SMC protocols are only used for transformation
and measurement operations, which improves performance.
For example, the AHP algorithm for histogram release
[107] works as follows: first, a noisy histogram, Hˆ , is released
using budget ϵ1. This is followed by post-processing steps of
thresholding, sorting and clustering resulting in H¯ . Then a
final histogram, H˜ , is computed with privacy budget ϵ − ϵ1.
An implementation of the entire algorithm in a single SMC
protocol using the EMP toolkit [2] takes 810s for a dataset
of size ≈ 33, 000 and histogram size 100. In contrast, Cryptϵ
uses SMC protocols only for the first and third steps. Cryptϵ
automatically detects that the second post-processing step
can be performed in the clear. A Cryptϵ program for this
runs in 238s (3.4× less time than the EMP implementation)
for the same dataset and histogram sizes.
Last, the security (privacy) proofs for just stand-alone
cryptographic and DP mechanisms can be notoriously tricky
[19, 75]. Combining the two thus exacerbates the technical
complexity, making the design vulnerable to faulty proofs
[59]. For example, given any arbitrary DP program written
under the CDP model, the distinction between intermedi-
ate results that can be released and the ones which have to
be kept private is often ambiguous. An instance of this is
observed in the Noisy-Max algorithm, where the array of
intermediate noisy counts is private. However, these inter-
mediate noisy counts correspond to valid query responses.
Thus, an incautious analyst, in a bid to improve performance,
might reuse a previously released noisy count query out-
put for a subsequent execution of the Noisy-Max algorithm
leading to privacy leakage. In contrast, Cryptϵ is designed
to reveal nothing other than the outputs of the DP programs
to the untrusted servers; every Cryptϵ program comes with
an automatic proof of security (privacy). Referring back to
the aforementioned example, in Cryptϵ , the Noisy-Max al-
gorithm is implemented as a secure measurement operator
thereby preventing any accidental privacy leakage. The ad-
vantages of a programming framework is further validated
by the popularity of systems like PINQ [77], Featherweight
PINQ [40], Ektelo [106] - frameworks for the CDP setting.
Data Owners are Offline: Recall, Cryptϵ ’s goal is to mimic
the CDP model with untrusted servers. Hence, it is designed
so that the data owners are offline after submitting their
encrypted records to the AS.
Low burden on CSP: Cryptϵ views the AS as an extension
of the analyst; the AS has a vested interest in obtaining the
result of the programs. Thus we require the AS to perform
the majority of the work for any program; interactions with
the CSP should be minimal and related to data decryption.
Keeping this in mind, the AS performs most of the data trans-
formations by itself (Table 3). Specifically for every Cryptϵ
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program, the AS processes the whole database and trans-
forms it into concise representations (an encrypted scalar or
a short vector) which is then decrypted by the CSP. An ex-
ample real world setting can be when Google and Symantec
assumes the role of the AS and the CSP respectively.
Separation of logical programming framework andun-
derlying physical implementation: The programming
framework is independent from the underlying implemen-
tation. This allows certain flexibility in the choice for the
implementation. For example, we use one-hot-encoding as
the input data format (Section 2). However, any other encod-
ing scheme like range based encoding can be used instead.
Another example is that in this paper, we use ϵ-DP (pure
DP) for our privacy analysis, other DP notions like (ϵ,δ )-DP,
Rènyi DP [78] can be used. Similarly, it is straightforward
to replace LHE with the optimized HE scheme in [21] or
garbled circuits with the ABY framework [35].
Yet another alternative implementation for Cryptϵ could
be where the private database is equally shared between the
two servers and they engage in a secret share based SMC
protocol for executing the DP programs. This would require
both the servers to do almost equal amount of work for
each program. Such an implementation would be justified
only if both the servers are equally invested in learning the
DP statistics and is ill-suited for our context. A real world
analogy for this can be if Google and Baidu decide to compute
some statistics on their combined user bases.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Differential Privacy
Definition 1. An algorithm A satisfies ϵ-differential pri-
vacy (ϵ-DP), where ϵ > 0 is a privacy parameter, iff for any
two neighboring datasets D and D ′ such that D = D ′ − t or
D ′ = D − t , we have
∀S ⊂ Ranдe(A), Pr [A(D) ∈ S ] ≤ eϵPr [A(D ′) ∈ S ] (1)
where Ranдe(A) denotes the set of all possible outputs of A.
The above definition is sometimes called unbounded DP.
A variant is bounded-DP where neighboring datasets D and
D ′ have the same number of rows and differ in one row. Any
ϵ-DP algorithm also satisfies 2ϵ-bounded DP [72].
Theorem 1. (Sequential Composition) IfA1 andA2 are ϵ1-
DP and ϵ2-DP algorithms with independent randomness, then
releasingA1(D) andA2(D) on database D satisfies ϵ1+ϵ2-DP.
Theorem 2. (Post-Processing) LetA : D 7→ R be a random-
ized algorithm that is ϵ-DP. Let f : R 7→ R′ be an arbitrary
randomized mapping. Then f ◦ A : D 7→ R′ is ϵ- DP.
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Linearly Homomorphic Encryption (LHE): If (M,+) is
a finite group, an LHE scheme for messages inM is:
• Key Generation (Gen): This algorithm takes the security
parameter κ as input and outputs a pair of secret and
public keys, (sk ,pk ) ← Gen(κ).
• Encryption (Enc): This is a randomized algorithm that
encrypts a message m ∈ M via the public key pk , to
generate ciphertext c← Encpk (m).
• Decryption (Dec): This uses the secret key sk to recover
the plaintextm from ciphertext c deterministically.
In addition, LHE supports the operator ⊕ that allows the
summation of ciphers as follows:
Operator ⊕: Let c1 ← Encpk (m1), . . . , ca ← Encpk (ma),a ∈
Z>0. Then we have Decsk (c1 ⊕ c2... ⊕ ca) =m1 + . . . +ma .
One can multiply a cipher c ← Encsk (m) by a plaintext posi-
tive integer a by a repetitions of ⊕. We denote this operation
by cMult(a, c) such that Decsk
(
cMult(a, c)) = a ·m.
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption(labHE): Any LHE
scheme can be extended to a labHE scheme [12] with the help
of a pseudo-random function. In addition to the operations
supported by an LHE scheme, labHE supports multiplication
of two labHE ciphers (details in Appendix A ).
Secure Computation: Garbled circuit [73, 103] is a generic
method for secure computation. Two data owners with re-
spective private inputs x1 and x2 run the protocol such that,
no party learns more than f (x1,x2) for a function f . One
of the data owners, called generator, builds a "garbled" ver-
sion of a circuit for f and sends it to the other data owner,
called evaluator, alongside the garbled input values for x1.
The evaluator, then, obtains the garbled input for x2 from
the generator via oblivious transfer and computes f (x1,x2).
4 CRYPTϵ SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe Cryptϵ ’s workflow (Section 4.1),
modules (Section 4.2), and trust assumptions (Section 4.3).
4.1 Cryptϵ Workflow
Cryptϵ operates in three phases:
(1) Setup Phase: At the outset, data owners initialize the
CSP with a privacy budget ϵB , which is stored in its Privacy
Engine module. Next, the CSP’s Key Manager module gener-
ates key pair (sk,pk) for labHE, publishes pk and stores sk .
(2) Data Collection Phase: In the next phase, each data
owner encodes and encrypts his/her record using the Data
Encoder and Data Encryption modules and sends the en-
crypted data records to the AS. The data owners are relieved
of all other duties and can go completely offline. The Ag-
gregator module of the AS then aggregates these encrypted
records into a single encrypted database D˜.
(3) Program Execution Phase: In this phase, the AS exe-
cutes a Cryptϵ program provided by the data analyst. Cryptϵ
programs (details in Sections 5 and 6) access the sensitive data
via a restricted set of transformation operators, that filter,
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count or group the data, and measurement operators, which
are DP operations to release noisy answers. Measurement
operators need interactions with the CSP as they require (a)
decryption of the answer, and (b) a check that the privacy
budget is not exceeded. These functionalities are achieved
by CSP’s Data Decryption and Privacy Engine modules.
The Setup and Data Collection phases occur just once at
the very beginning, every subsequent program is handled
via the corresponding Program Execution phase.
4.2 Cryptϵ Modules
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP)
(1) Key Manager: The Key Manager module initializes the
labHE scheme for Cryptϵ by generating its key pair (sk,pk).
It stores the secret key, sk with itself and releases the public
key, pk . The CSP has exclusive access to the secret key sk
and is the only entity capable of decryption in Cryptϵ .
(2) Privacy Engine: Cryptϵ starts off with a total privacy
budget of ϵB chosen by the data owners. The choice of value
for ϵB should be guided by social prerogatives [7, 61, 69]
and is currently outside the scope of Cryptϵ . For executing
any program, the AS has to interact with the CSP at least
once (for decrypting the noisy answer) thereby giving the
CSP the opportunity to monitor the AS’s actions in terms
of privacy budget expenditure. The Privacy Engine module
gets the program P and its allocated privacy budget ϵ from
the data analyst and maintains a public ledger that records
the privacy budget spent in executing each such program.
Once the privacy cost incurred reaches ϵB , the CSP refuses
to decrypt any further answers thereby ensuring that the
privacy budget is not exceeded. The ledger is completely
public allowing any data owner to verify it.
(3)Data Decryption: TheCSP being the only entity capable
of decryption, any measurement of the data (even noisy) has
to involve the CSP. The Data Decryption module is tasked
with handling all such interactions with the AS.
Data Owners (DO)
(1) Data Encoder: Each data owner, DOi , i ∈ [m], has a pri-
vate data record, Di , of the form ⟨A1, ...Al ⟩ where Aj is an
attribute. At the very outset, every data owner, DOi , repre-
sents his/her private record,Di , in its respective per attribute
one-hot-encoding format. The one-hot-encoding is a way of
representation for categorical attributes and is illustrated by
the following example. If the database schema is given by
⟨Aдe,Gender ⟩ then the corresponding one-hot-encoding rep-
resentation for a data owner, DOi , i ∈ [m], with the record
⟨30,Male⟩, is given by D˜i = ⟨[0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
29
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
70
], [1, 0]⟩.
(2) Data Encryption: The Data Encryption module stores
the public key pk of labHE which is announced by the CSP.
Each data owner, DOi , i ∈ [m], performs an element-wise
encryption of his/her per attribute one-hot-encodings using
pk and sends the encrypted record, D˜i, to the AS via a secure
channel. This is the only interaction that a data owner ever
participates in and goes offline after this.
Analytics Server (AS)
(1)Aggregator: TheAggregator collects the encrypted records,
D˜i , from each of the data owners, DOi , and collates them
into a single encrypted database, D˜.
(2) Program Executor: This module inputs a logical Cryptϵ
program and privacy parameter ϵ from a data analyst, trans-
lates it to the implementation specific secure computation
protocol and computes the noisy output with the CSP’s help.
4.3 Trust Model
There are three differences in Cryptϵ from the LDP setting:
(1) Semi-honest Model: We assume that the AS and the
CSP are semi-honest, i.e., they follow the protocol honestly,
but their contents and computations can be observed by an
adversary. Additionally, each data owner has a private chan-
nel with the AS. For real world scenarios, the semi-honest
behaviour can be imposed via legal bindings. Specifically,
both the AS and the CSP can swear to their semi-honest
behavior in legal affidavits; there will be loss of face in public
and legal implications in case of breach of conduct.
(2) Non-Collusion: We assume that the AS and the CSP
are non-colluding, i.e., they avoid revealing useful informa-
tion [63] to each other beyond what is allowed by the pro-
tocol definition. This restriction can be imposed via strict
legal bindings as well. Additionally, in our setting the CSP
is a third-party entity with no vested interested in learning
the program outputs. Hence, the CSP has little incentive
to collude with the AS. Physical enforcement of the non-
collusion condition can be done by implementing the CSP
inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) or via tech-
niques which involve using a trusted mediator who monitors
the communications between the servers [11].
(3)Computational Boundedness: The adversary is compu-
tationally bounded. Hence the DP guarantee obtained is that
of computational differential privacy or SIM-CDP [79]. There
is a separation between the algorithmic power of computa-
tional DP and information-theoretic DP in the multi-party
setting [79]. Hence this assumption is inevitable in Cryptϵ .
5 CRYPTϵ OPERATORS
Let us consider an encrypted instance of a database, D˜, with
schema ⟨A1, . . . ,Al ⟩. In this section, we define the Cryptϵ
operators (summarized in Table 1) and illustrate how to write
logical Cryptϵ programs for DP algorithms on D˜. The design
of Cryptϵ operators are inspired by previous work [77, 106].
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Table 1: Cryptϵ Operators
Types Name Notation Input Output Functionality
Transformation
CrossProduct ×Ai ,Aj→A′(·) T˜ T˜ ′ Generates a new attribute A
′ (in one-hot-coding) to represent
the data for both the attributes Ai and Aj
Project πA∗ (·) T˜ T˜ ′ Discards all attributes but A∗
Filter σϕ (·) T˜ B′ Zeros out records not satisfying ϕ in B
Count count(·) T˜ c Counts the number of 1s in B
GroupByCount γ countA (·) T˜ V Returns encrypted histogram of A
GroupByCountEncoded γ˜ countA (·) T˜ V˜ Returns encrypted histogram of A in one-hot-encoding
CountDistinct countD(·) V c Counts the number of non-zero values in V
Measurement Laplace Lapϵ,∆(·) V \c Vˆ Adds Laplace noise to V
NoisyMax NoisyMaxkϵ,∆(·) V Pˆ Returns indices of the top k noisy values
5.1 Transformation operators
Transformation operators input encrypted data and output a
transformed encrypted data. These operators thus work com-
pletely on the encrypted data without expending any privacy
budget. Three types of data are considered in this context:
(1) an encrypted table, T˜ , of x rows and y columns/attributes
where each attribute value is represented by its encrypted
one-hot-encoding; (2) an encrypted vector, V ; and (3) an en-
crypted scalar, c . In addition, every encrypted table, T˜ , of
x rows has an encrypted bit vector, B, of size x to indicate
whether the rows are relevant to the program at hand. The
i-th row in T˜ will be used for answering the current program
only if the i-th bit value of B is 1. The input to the first trans-
formation operator in Cryptϵ program is D˜ with all bits of
B set to be 1. For brevity, we use just T˜ to represent both the
encrypted table, T˜ , and B. The transformation operators are:
(1) CrossProduct ×(Ai ,Aj )→A′(T˜ ): This operator transforms
the two encrypted one-hot-encodings for attributes Ai and
Aj in T˜ into a single encrypted one-hot-encoding of a new
attribute A′. The domain of the new attribute A′ is the cross
product of the domains for Ai and Aj . The resulting table T˜
′
has one column less than T˜ . Thus, the construction of the
one-hot-encoding of the entire y-dimensional domain can
be computed by repeated application of this operator.
(2) Project πA¯(T˜ ): This operator projects T˜ on a subset of
attributes A¯ of the input table. All the attributes that are not
in A¯ are discarded from the output table T˜ ′.
(3) Filter σϕ (T˜ ): This operator specifies a filtering condition,
represented by a Boolean predicate ϕ defined over a subset
of attributes A¯ of the input table T˜ . The predicate can be
expressed as a conjunction of range conditions over A¯, i.e.,
for a row r ∈ T˜ , ϕ(r ) = ∧Ai ∈A¯ (r .Ai ∈ VAi ), where r .Ai is
value of attribute Ai in row r and VA is a subset of values
(can be a singleton) that Ai can take. For example, Aдe ∈
[30, 40]∧Gender = M can be a filtering condition. The Filter
operator affects only the associated encrypted bit vector of T˜
and keeps the actual table untouched. If any row r ∈ T˜ does
not satisfy the filtering condition ϕ, the corresponding bit in
B will be set to labEncpk (0); otherwise, the corresponding bit
value in B is kept unchanged. Thus the Filter transformation
suppresses all the records that are extraneous to answering
the program at hand (i.e., does not satisfy ϕ) by explicitly
zeroing the corresponding indicator bits and outputs the
table T˜ ′ with the updated indicator vector.
(4)Count count(T˜ ): This operator simply counts the number
of rows in T˜ that are pertinent to the program at hand, i.e.
the number of 1s in its associated bit vector B. This operator
outputs an encrypted scalar c .
(5) GroupByCount γ countA (T˜): The GroupByCount opera-
tor partitions the input table T˜ into groups of rows having
the same value for an attribute A. The output of this trans-
formation is an encrypted vector V that counts the number
of unfiltered rows for each value of A. This operator serves
as a preceding transformation for other Cryptϵ operators
specifically NoisyMax, CountDistinct and Laplace.
(6) GroupByCountEncoded γ˜ countA (T˜): This operator is
similar to GroupByCount. The only difference between the
two is that, GroupByCountEncoded outputs a new table that
has two columns – the first column corresponds toA and the
second column corresponds to the number of rows for every
value of A (in one-hot-encoding). This operator is useful for
expressing computations of the form “count the number of
age values having at least 200 records" (see P7 in Table 2).
(7) CountDistinct countD(V): This operator is always pre-
ceded by GroupByCount. Hence the input vector V is an
encrypted histogram for attribute A and this operator re-
turns the number of distinct values of A that appear in D˜ by
counting the non-zero entries of V .
5.2 Measurement operators
The measurement operators take encrypted vector of counts
V (or a single count c) as input and return noisy measure-
ments on it in the clear. These two operators correspond
to two classic DP mechanisms – Laplace mechanism and
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Noisy-Max [38]. Bothmechanisms add Laplace noiseη scaled
according to the transformations applied to D˜.
Let the sequence of transformations (T¯ = (Tl , . . . ,T1))
applied on D˜ to get V be T¯ (D) = Tl (· · · T2((T1(D)))). The
sensitivity of a sequence of transformations is defined as the
maximum change to the output of this sequence of trans-
formations [77] when changing a row in the input database,
i.e., ∆T¯ = maxD,D′ ∥T¯ (D) − T¯ (D ′)∥1 where D and D ′ differ
in a single row. The sensitivity of T¯ can be upper bounded
by the product of the stability ([77]) of these transformation
operators, i.e. ∆T¯=(Tl , ...,T1) =
∏l
i=1 ∆Ti . The transformations
in Table 1 have a stability of 1, except for GroupByCount
and GroupByCountEncoded has a stability of 2. Given ϵ and
∆T¯ , we define the measurement operators –
(1) Laplace Lapϵ,∆(V/c): This operator implements the clas-
sic Laplace mechanism [38]. Given an encrypted vectorV or
an encrypted scalar c , a privacy parameter ϵ and sensitivity
∆ of the preceding transformations, the operator adds noise
drawn from Lap( 2·∆ϵ ) toV or c and outputs the noisy answer.
(2) NoisyMax NoisyMaxkϵ,∆(V): Noisy-Max is a differen-
tially private selection mechanism [38, 47] to determine the
top k highest valued queries. This operator takes in an en-
crypted vector V and adds independent Laplace noise from
Lap( 2·k ·∆ϵ ) to each count. The indices for the top k noisy val-
ues, Pˆ, are reported as the desired answer.
5.3 Program Examples
A Cryptϵ program is a sequence of transformation oper-
ators followed by a measurement operator and arbitrary
post-processing. Consider a database schema ⟨Aдe , Gender ,
NativeCountry, Race⟩. We show 7 Cryptϵ program exam-
ples in Table 2 over this database.
We will use P1 in Table 2 to illustrate how a Cryptϵ pro-
gram can be written and analyzed. Program P1 aims to com-
pute the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of attribute
Aдe with domain [1, 100]. The first step is to compute 100
range queries, where the i-th query computes the the number
of records in D˜ having Aдe ∈ [1, i] with privacy parame-
ter ϵi . The sequence of transformation operators for each
range query is count(σAдe ∈[1,i](πAдe (D˜))). All these three
operators have a stability of 1 and hence the resulted range
query has a sensitivity upper bounded by the product of
these stability values, 1 [77]. Thus, the subsequent measure-
ment operator Laplace for the i-th range query takes in the
privacy budget ϵi and sensitivity ∆ = 1 and outputs a noisy
plaintext count cˆi . At this stage the program is
∑100
i=1 ϵi/2-DP
by Theorem 1[38] (recall we add noise from Lap(2 · ∆/ϵi )
in Section 5.2). After looping over the 100 ranges, P1 ob-
tains a noisy plaintext output Vˆ = [cˆ1, ..., cˆ100] and applies
a post-processing step, denoted by postc .d .f (Vˆ ). This oper-
ator inputs a noisy histogram Vˆ for attribute A and com-
putes its c.d.f Vˆ ′ = [cˆ ′1, ..., cˆ ′100] via isotonic regression [57]
minVˆ ′ ∥Vˆ ′ − Vˆ ∥2 s .t . 0 ≤ cˆ ′1 ≤ · · · ≤ cˆ ′100 ≤ |D˜ |. Hence, by
Theorem 2, P1 is ϵ/2-DP, where ϵ = ∑100i=1 ϵi . However, since
Cryptϵ also reveals the total dataset size, the total privacy
guarantee is ϵ-bounded DP (see Section 7 for details).
6 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe the implementation of Cryptϵ .
First we discuss our proposed technique for extending the
multiplication operation of labHE to support n > 2 multi-
plicands which will be used for the CrossProduct operator.
Then we describe the implementations of Cryptϵ operators.
6.1 General labHE n-way Multiplication
labHE scheme is an extension of a LHE scheme where ev-
ery ciphertext is now associated with a “label” [12]. This
extension enables labHE to support multiplication of two
labHE ciphertexts via the labMult() operator (without in-
volving the CSP). However, it cannot support multiplication
of more than two ciphertexts because the“multiplication”
ciphertext e = labMult(c1, c2), (c1 and c2 are labHE cipher-
texts) does not have a corresponding label, i.e., it is not in
the correct labHE ciphertext format. Hence we propose an
algorithm дenLabMult to generate a label for every interme-
diary product of two multiplicands to enable generic n-way
multiplication. Details are presented in Algorithm 1 .
6.2 Operator Implementation
We now summarize how Cryptϵ operators are translated to
protocols that the AS and CSP can run on encrypted data.
Project πA¯(T˜ ): The implementation of this operator simply
drops off all but the attributes in A¯ from the input table T˜
and returns the truncated table T˜ ′.
Filter σϕ (T˜ ): Let ϕ be a predicate on an attribute of the form
r .Aj ∈ VAj . Row i satisfies the filter if one of the bits corre-
sponding to positions inVAj is 1. Thus the bit corresponding
to row i is set to: B[i] = labMult(B[i],⊕l ∈VAj v˜j [l]). Multi-
attribute implementation is detailed in Appendix D.2 .
CrossProduct×Ai ,Aj→A′(T˜ ): The crossproduct between two
attributes are computed usingдenLabMult() described above.
Count count(T˜ ): This operator simply adds up the bits in B
corresponding to input table T˜ , i.e.,
⊕
i B[i].
GroupByCountγ countA (T˜): The implementations for Project,
Filter and Count are reused here. First, Cryptϵ projects the
input table T˜ on attribute A, i.e. T˜ 1 = πA(T˜ ). Then, Cryptϵ
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Table 2: Examples of Cryptϵ Program
Cryptϵ Program Description
P1: ∀i ∈ [1, 100], cˆi ← Lapϵi ,1(count(σAдe ∈(0,i](πAдe (D˜)))); postc .d .f ([cˆ1, . . . , cˆ100]) Outputs the c.d.f of Aдe with domain [1, 100].
P2: Pˆ ← NoisyMax5ϵ,1(γ countAдe (D˜)) Outputs the 5 most frequent age values.
P3: Vˆ ← Lapϵ,2(γ countRace×Gender (πRace×Gender (×Race,Gender→Race×Gender (D˜)))) Outputs the marginal over the attributes Race and Gender .
P4: Vˆ ← Lapϵ,2(γ countAдe×Gender (σNativeCountry=Mexico(πAдe×Gender,NativeCountry (×Aдe,Gender→Aдe×Gender (D˜))))) Outputs the marginal over Aдe and Gender for Mexican employees.
P5: cˆ ← Lapϵ,1(count(σAдe=30∧Gender=Male∧NativeCountry=Mexico(πAдe,Gender,NativeCountry (D˜)))) Counts the number of male employees of Mexico having age 30.
P6: cˆ ← Lapϵ,2(countD(γ countAдe (σGender=Male (πAдe,Gender (D˜))))) Counts the number of distinct age values for the male employees.
P7: cˆ ← Lapϵ,2(count(σCount ∈[200,m](γ˜ countAдe (πAдe (D˜))))) Counts the number of age values having at least 200 records.
loops each possible value of A. For each value v , Cryptϵ ini-
tializes a temporary Bv = B and filters T˜
′ on A = v to get an
updated B′v . Finally, Cryptϵ outputs the number of 1s in B′v .
GroupByCountEncoded γ˜ countA (T˜): For this operator, the
AS first uses GroupByCount to generate the encrypted his-
togram V for attribute A. Since each entry of V is a count of
rows, its value ranges from {0, ..., |T˜ |}. The AS then masksV
and sends it to the CSP. The purpose of this mask is to hide
the true histogram from the CSP. Next the CSP generates the
encrypted one-hot-coding representation for this masked
histogram V˜ and returns it to the AS. The AS can simply
rotate V˜[i], i ∈ [|V |] by its respective mask valueM[i] and
get back the true encrypted histogram in one-hot-coding V˜ .
Details are presented in in in Algorithm 2 Appendix D.2 .
CountDistinct countD(V ): This operator is implemented
by a garbled circuit. Details are in Appendix D.2 .
Laplace Lapϵ,∆(V \c): The Laplace operator has two phases
(since both AS and CSP adds Laplace noise). In the first
phase, the AS adds an instance of encrypted Laplace noise
η1 ∼ Lap( 2∆ϵ ) to the encrypted input to generate cˆ. In the
second phase, the CSP first checks whether
∑t
i=1 ϵi + ϵ ≤ ϵB
where ϵi represents the privacy budget used for a previously
executed program Pi (we presume that a total of t ∈ N
programs have been executed hitherto the details of which
are logged into the CSP’s public ledger). Only in the event
the above check is satisfied, the CSP proceeds to decrypt cˆ
and records ϵ and the current program details (description,
sensitivity) in the public ledger. Next the CSP adds a second
instance of the Laplace noise η2 ∼ Lap( 2∆ϵ ) to generate the
final noisy output cˆ in the clear. The Laplace operator with
an encrypted scalar V as the input is implemented similarly.
NoisyMax NoisyMaxkϵ,∆(V ): This operator is implemented
using two-party computation between AS and CSP using
garbled circuits. Details are in Appendix D.2 .
Note: Cryptϵ programs are grouped into three classes based
on the number and type of interaction between the AS and
the CSP. For example P1, P2 and P3 (Table 2) have just one
interaction with the CSP for decrypting the noisy output. P4
and P5, on the other hand, require additional interactions
for the n-way multiplication of ciphers in the CrossProduct
operator. Finally P6 and P7 require intermediate intercations
due to operators CountDistinct and GroupByCountEncoded
respectively. The details are presented in Appendix E .
7 CRYPTϵ SECURITY SKETCH
In this section we provide a sketch of the security proof in
the semi-honest model using the well established simulation
argument [86].
Cryptϵ takes as input a DP program P and a privacy pa-
rameter ϵ , and translates it into a protocol Π which in turn
is executed at the AS and the CSP. In addition to revealing
the output of the program P , Π also reveals the number of
records in the dataset D. Let PCDP (D, ϵ/2) denote the ran-
dom variable corresponding to the output of running P in
the CDP model under ϵ/2-DP (Definition 1). We make the
following claims:
• The views and outputs of the AS andCSP are computation-
ally indistinguishable from that of simulators with access
to only PCDP (D, ϵ/2) and the total dataset size |D|.
• For every P that satisfies ϵ/2-DP (Definition 1), revealing
its output (distributed identical to PCDP (D, ϵ/2)) as well as
|D| satisfies ϵ-bounded DP, where neighboring databases
have the same size but differ in one row.
• Thus the overall protocol satisfies computational differen-
tial privacy under the SIM-CDP model.
Now, let PCDPB (D, ϵ) denote the random variable correspond-
ing to the output of running P in the CDP model under ϵ-
bounded DP such that PCDPB (D, ϵ) ≡ (PCDP (D, ϵ/2), |D|).
We state the main theorems here and refer the reader to the
Appendix A) for formal proofs.
Theorem 3. Let protocol Π correspond to the execution
of program P in Cryptϵ . The views and outputs of AS and
CSP are denoted as ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵ),OutputΠ1 (P ,D, ϵ) and
ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵ),OutputΠ2 (P ,D, ϵ) respectively. There exists
Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) simulators Sim1 and
Sim2 such that:
• Sim1(PCDPB (D, ϵ)) is computationally indistinguishable
(≡c ) from (ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵ),OutputΠ(P ,D, ϵ)), and
• Sim2(PCDPB (D, ϵ)) is≡c to (ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵ),OutputΠ(P ,D, ϵ)).
OutputΠ(P ,D, ϵ)) is the combined output of the two parties1.
1Note that the simulators are passed a random variable PCDPB (D, ϵ )), i.e.,
the simulator is given the ability to sample from this distribution.
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The main ingredient for the proof is the composition the-
orem [86], which informally states: suppose a protocol Πдf
implements functionality f and uses function д as an oracle
( uses only input-output behavior of д). Assume that pro-
tocol Πд implements д and calls to д in Πдf are replaced by
instances of Πд (referred to as the composite protocol). If Πf
and Πд are correct (satisfy the above simulator definition),
then the composite protocol is correct. Thus the proof can
be done in a modular fashion as long as the underlying oper-
ators are used in a blackbox manner (only the input-output
behavior are used and none of the internal state are used).
Next, every program that is input to Cryptϵ ensures ϵ/2-
DP (as in Definition 1). It is so because recall that the mea-
surement operators add noise from Lap( 2·∆ϵ ) (Section 5.2)
where ∆ denotes the sensitivity of P (computed w.r.t to Def-
inition 1) and therefore satisfy ϵ/2-DP [38, 47]. Thus any
Cryptϵ program expressed as a sequence of transformation
operators, T¯ followed by a measurement operator satisfies
ϵ/2-DP (Section 5.2). However, Cryptϵ reveals both the out-
put of the algorithm as well as the total size of the data D.
While revealing the size exactly would violate Definition 1,
it does satisfy bounded-DP albeit with twice the privacy pa-
rameter, ϵ – changing a row in D is equivalent to adding a
row and then removing a row.
Finally, since every program P executed on Cryptϵ sat-
isfies ϵ-bounded DP, it follows from Theorem 3 that every
execution of Cryptϵ satisfies computational DP.
Corollary 4. Protocol Π satisfies computational differen-
tial privacy under the SIM-CDP notion [79].
Note that Theorem 3 assumes that AS and CSP do not
collude with the users (data owners). However, if AS colludes
with a subset of the usersU , it means that Sim1 (Sim2) has to
be given the data corresponding to users inU as additional
parameters. This presents no complications in the proof (see
the proof in [48]). If a new user u joins, their data can be
encrypted and simply added to the database. We discuss
extensions to handle malicious adversaries in Section 10.
8 CRYPTϵ OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section we present the optimizations used by Cryptϵ .
8.1 DP Index Optimization
This optimization is motivated by the fact that several pro-
grams first filter out a large number of rows in the dataset.
For instance, P5 in Table 2 constructs a histogram over Aдe
andGender on the subset of rows for which NativeCountry
is Mexico. Our filter implementation keeps all the rows as
the AS has no way of telling whether the filter condition is
satisfied. As a result, the subsequent GroupbyCount is run
on the full dataset. If there were an index on NativeCountry,
Cryptϵ could run the GroupbyCount on only the subset
of rows with NativeCountry=Mexico, but an exact index
would violate DP. Hence, we propose a DP index to bound
the information leakage while improving the performance.
At a high level, the DP index on any ordinal attribute
A is constructed as follows: (a) securely sort the input en-
crypted database D˜ on A and (b) learn a mapping F from
the domain of A to [1, |D˜ |] such that most of the rows with
index less than F (v),v ∈ domain(A) have a value less than
v . The secure sorting is done via the following garbled cir-
cuit that 1) inputs D˜ (just the records without any iden-
tifying features) and indexing attribute A from the AS 2)
inputs the secret key sk from the CSP 3) decrypts and sortD
on A 4) re-encrypt the sorted database using pk and out-
puts D˜s = labEncpk (sort(D)). The mapping F must be
learned under DP, and we present a method for that be-
low. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pk ) be an equi-width partition on the
sorted domain ofA such that each partition (bin) contains sAk
consecutive domain values where sA is the domain size of A.
The index is constructed using a Cryptϵ program that firstly
computes the noisy prefix counts, Vˆ [i] = ∑v ∈∪il=1Pl ctA,v +ηi
for i ∈ [k], where ηi ∼ Lap(2 · k/ϵA) and ctA,v denotes the
number of rows with value v for A. Next the program uses
isotonic regression [57] on Vˆ to generate a noisy cumulative
histogram C˜ with non-decreasing counts. Thus, each prefix
count in C˜ gives an approximate index for the sorted data-
base where the values of attribute A change from being in
Pi to a value in Pi+1. When a Cryptϵ program starts with
a filter ϕ = A ∈ [vs ,ve ], we compute two indices for the
sorted database is and ie as follows. Let vs and ve fall in
partitions Pi and Pj respectively. If Pi is the first partition,
then we set is = 0; otherwise set is to be 1 more than the
i − 1-th noisy prefix count from C˜. Similarly, if Pj is the last
partition, then we set ie = |D˜ |; otherwise, we set ie to be
the j + 1-th noisy prefix count from C˜. This gives us the DP
mapping F . We then run the program on the subset of rows
in [is , ie ]. For example, in Figure 2, the indexing attribute
with domain {v1, · · · ,v10} has been partitioned into k = 5
bins and if ϕ ∈ [v3,v6], is = C˜[1]+ 1 = 6 and ie = C˜[3] = 13.
Lemma 5. Let P be the program that computes the map-
ping F . Let Π be the Cryptϵ protocol corresponding to the
construction of the DP index. The views and outputs of AS
and CSP are denoted as ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA), OutputΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA)
and ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA), OutputΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA) respectively. There
exists PPT simulators Sim1 and Sim2 such that:
• Sim1(PCDPB (D, ϵA)) ≡c (ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA),OutputΠ(D, ϵA)), and
• Sim2(PCDPB (D, ϵ)) ≡c (ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA),OutputΠ(D, ϵA)).
OutputΠ(P ,D, ϵA)) is the combined output of the two parties
The proof of the above lemma is presented in Appendix
D.3 . Here we present the intuition behind it. From the secure
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Figure 2: Illustrative example for DP Index
sorting algorithm (steps 1 and 4), it is evident that the servers
cannot associate the records of the encrypted sorted dataset
D˜s with the data owners. The AS can learn nothing from D˜s
due to the semantic security of the LHE scheme used. This
ensures that the DP index construction of Cryptϵ satisfies
the SIM-CDP privacy guarantee.
• Optimized feature: This optimization speeds up the ex-
ecution by reducing the total number of rows to be pro-
cessed for the program.
• Trade-off: The trade-off is a possible increase in error
as some rows that satisfy the filter condition may not be
selected due to the noisy index.
• Privacy Cost: Assuming the index is constructed with a
privacy parameter ϵA, the selection of a subset of rows
using it will be ϵA-bounded DP (Lemma 5). If ϵL is the pa-
rameter used for the subsequent measurement primitives,
then by Theorem 1, the total privacy parameter is ϵA + ϵL .
Discussion: Here we discuss the various parameters in the
construction of a DP index. The foremost parameter is the
indexing attribute A which can be chosen with the help of
the following two heuristics. First, A should be frequently
queried so that a large number of queries can benefit from
this optimization. Second, choose A such that the selectivity
of the popular queried values ofA is high. This would ensure
that the first selection performed alone on A will filter out
majority of the rows reducing the intermediate dataset size
to be considered for the subsequent operators. The next
parameter is the fraction of the program privacy budget, ρ
(ϵA = ρ · ϵ where ϵ is the total program privacy budget) that
should be used towards building the index. The higher the
value of ρ, the better is the accuracy of the index (hence
better speed-up). However, the privacy budget allocated for
the rest of the program decreases resulting in increased noise
in the final answer. This trade-off is studied in Figures 4a and
4b in Section 9. Another parameter is the number of bins k .
Finer binning gives more resolution, but leads to more error
due to DP noise addition. Coarser binning introduces error in
indexing, but have lower error due to noise. We explore this
trade-off in Figures 4c and 4d. To increase accuracy we can
also consider bins preceding is and bins succeeding ie . This
is so because, since the index is noisy, it might miss out some
rows that satisfy the filter condition. For example, in Figure
2, both the indices is = C˜[1]+ 1 = 6 and ie = C˜[3] = 14 miss
a row satisfying the filter condition ϕ = A ∈ [v3,v6]; hence
including an extra neighboring bin would reduce the error.
Thus, in order to gain in performance, the proposed DP in-
dex optimization allows some DP leakage of the data. This is
in tune with the works in [27, 52, 59, 76]. However, our work
differs from earlier work in the fact that we can achieve pure
DP (albeit SIM-CDP). In contrast, previous work achieved
a weaker version of DP, approximate DP [18], and added
one-sided noise (i.e., only positive noise). One-sided noise
requires addition of dummy rows in the data, and hence in-
creases the data size. However, in our Cryptϵ programs, all
the rows in the noisy set are part of the real dataset.
8.2 Crypto-Engineering Optimizations
(1)DPRangeTree: If range queries are common, pre-computed
noisy range trees is a useful optimization. For example, build-
ing a range tree on Aдe attribute can improve the accuracy
for P1 and P2 in Table 2. The sensitivity for such a noisy
range tree is log sA where sA is the domain size of the at-
tribute on which the tree is constructed. Any arbitrary range
query requires access to at most 2 log sA nodes on the tree.
Thus to answer all possible range queries on A, the total
squared error accumulated is O( s2(log sA)2ϵ ). In contrast for
the naive case, we would have incurred error O( s3Aϵ ) [57].
Note that, if we already have a DP index on A, then the DP
range tree can be considered to be a secondary index on A.
• Optimized Feature: The optimization reduces both exe-
cution time and expected error when executed over multi-
ple range queries.
• Trade-off: The trade-off for this optimization is the stor-
age cost of the range tree (O(2 · sA)).
• Privacy Cost: If the range tree is constructed with pri-
vacy parameter ϵR , then any measurement on it is post-
processing. Hence, the privacy cost is ϵR-bounded DP.
(2) Precomputation: The CrossProduct primitive generates
the one-hot-coding of data across two attributes. However,
this step is costly due to the intermediate interactions with
the CSP. Hence, a useful optimization is to pre-compute the
one-hot-codings for the data across a set of frequently used
attributes A¯ so that for subsequent program executions, the
AS can get the desired representation via simple look-ups.
For example, this benefits P3 (Table 2).
• Optimized Feature: This reduces the execution time of
Cryptϵ programs. Themulti-attribute one-hot-codings can
be re-used for all subsequent programs.
• Trade-off: The trade-off is the storage cost (O(m · sA¯ =
m ·∏A∈A¯ sA),m = the number of data owners) incurred
to store the multi-attribute one-hot-codings for A¯.
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• Privacy Cost: The computation is carried completely on
the encrypted data, no privacy budget is expended.
(3) Offline Processing: For GroupByCountEncoded, the
CSP needs to generate the encrypted one-hot-codings for
the masked histogram. Note that the one-hot-encoding rep-
resentation for any such count would simply be a vector of
(|D˜ | − 1) ciphertexts for ‘0’, labEncpk (0) and 1 ciphertext for
‘1’, labEncpk (1). Thus one useful optimization is to gener-
ate these ciphertexts offline (similar to offline generation of
Beaver’s multiplication triples [15] used in SMC). Hence, the
program execution will not be blocked by encryption.
• Optimized Feature: This optimization results in a reduc-
tion in the run time of Cryptϵ programs.
• Trade-off: A storage cost of O(m · sA) is incurred to store
the ciphers for attribute A.
• Privacy Cost: The computation is carried completely on
the encrypted data, no privacy budget is expended.
9 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we describe our evaluation of Cryptϵ along
two dimensions, accuracy and performance of Cryptϵ pro-
grams. Specifically we address the following questions:
• Q1: Do Cryptϵ programs have significantly lower errors
than that for the corresponding state-of-the-art LDP im-
plementations? Additionally is the accuracy of Cryptϵ
programs comparable to that of the corresponding CDP
implementations?
• Q2: Do the proposed optimizations provide substantial
performance improvement over unoptimized Cryptϵ?
• Q3: Is the execution time for Cryptϵ programs practical
and do they scale well?
Evaluation Highlights:
• Cryptϵ can achieve up to 50× smaller error than the corre-
sponding LDP implementation on a data of size ∼ 30, 000
(Figure 3). Additionally, Cryptϵ errors are at most 2×more
than that of the corresponding CDP implementation.
• The optimizations in Cryptϵ can improve the performance
of unoptimized Cryptϵ by up to 5667× (Table 3).
• A large class of Cryptϵ programs execute within 3.6 hours
for a dataset of size 106 and they scale linearly with the
dataset size (Figure 5). The AS performs majority of the
work for most programs (Table 3).
9.1 Methodology
Programs: To answer the aforementioned questions we ran
the experiments on the Cryptϵ programs previously outlined
in Table 3. Due to space limitations we present the results of
only four of them in the main paper namely P1,P3,P5 and P7.
The rationale behind choosing these four is that they cover
all three classes of programs (Section 5.3) and showcase the
advantages for all of the four proposed optimizations.
Dataset: We ran our experiments on the Adult dataset from
the UCI repository [6]. The dataset is of size 32, 651. For the
scaling experiments (Figure 5), we create toy datasets of sizes
100K and 1 million by copying over the Adult dataset.
Accuracy Metrics: Programs with scalar outputs (P5, P7)
use absolute error |c − cˆ | where c is the true count and cˆ is the
noisy output. Programs with vector outputs (P1, P3) use the
L1 error metric given by Error =
∑
i |V [i] − Vˆ [i]|, i ∈ [|V |]
where V is the true vector and Vˆ is the noisy vector. We
report the mean and s.t.d of error values over 10 repetitions.
Performance Metrics: We report the mean total execution
time in seconds for each program, over 10 repetitions.
Configuration: We implemented Cryptϵ in Python with the
garbled circuit implemented via EMP toolkit [2]. We use Pail-
lier encryption scheme [87]. All the experiments have been
performed on the Google Cloud Platform [1] with the config-
uration c2-standard-8. For Adult dataset, Cryptϵ constructs
a DP index optimization over the attribute NativeCountry
that benefits programs like P4 and P5. Our experiments as-
sign 20% of the total program privacy parameter towards
constructing the index and the rest is used for the remaining
program execution. Cryptϵ also constructs a DP range tree
over Aдe . This helps programs like P1, P2 and P3. This is our
default Cryptϵ implementation.
9.2 End-to-end Accuracy Comparison
In this section we evaluate Q1 by performing a comparative
analysis between the empirical accuracy of the aforemen-
tioned four Cryptϵ programs (both optimized and unopti-
mized) and that of the corresponding state-of-the-art LDP
[95] andCDP (under bounded DP; specifically using theCDP
view Cryptϵ is computationally indistinguishable from as
shown in Section 7) [38] implementations.
The first observation with respect to accuracy is that the
mean error for a single frequency count for Cryptϵ is at least
50× less than that of the corresponding LDP implementation.
For example, Figure 3b shows that for P3, ϵ = 0.1 results in a
mean error of 599.7 as compared to an error of 34301.02 for
the corresponding LDP implementation. Similarly, P5 (Figure
3c) gives a mean error of only 58.7 for ϵ = 0.1. In contrast, the
corresponding LDP implementation has an error of 3199.96.
For P1 (c.d.f onAдe), the mean error for Cryptϵ for ϵ = 0.1 is
given by 0.82 while the corresponding LDP implementation
has an error of 9.2. The accuracy improvement on P7 (Figure
3d) by Cryptϵ is less significant as compared to the other
programs, because P7 outputs the number of age values
([1 − 100]) having 200 records. At ϵ = 0.1, at least 52 age
values out of 100 are reported incorrectly on whether their
counts pass the threshold. Cryptϵ reduces the error almost by
half. Note that the additive error for a single frequency count
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Figure 3: Accuracy Analysis of Cryptϵ Programs
query in the LDP setting is at least Ω(√n/ϵ), thus the error
increases with dataset size. On the other hand, for Cryptϵ the
error is of the order O(1/ϵ), hence with increasing dataset
size the relative the error improvement for Cryptϵ over that
of an equivalent implementation in LDP would increase.
For P1 (Figure 3a), we observe that the error of Cryptϵ
is around 5× less than that of the unoptimized implemen-
tation. The reason is that, P1 constructs the c.d.f over the
attribute Aдe (with domain size 100) by first executing 100
range queries. Thus, if the total privacy budget for the pro-
gram is ϵ , then for unoptimized Cryptϵ , each query gets a
privacy parameter of just ϵ100 . In contrast, the DP range tree
is constructed with the full budget ϵ and sensitivity ⌈log 100⌉
thereby resulting in lesser error. For P5 (Figure 3c) however,
the unoptimized implementation has slightly better accuracy
(around 1.4×) than Cryptϵ . It is because of two reasons; firstly
the noisy index on NativeCountry might miss some of the
rows satisfying the filter condition (NativeCountry=Mexico).
Secondly, since only 0.8% of the total privacy parameter is
budgeted for the Laplace operator in the optimized program
execution, this results in a higher error as compared to that
of unoptimized Cryptϵ . However, this is a small cost to pay
for achieving a performance gain of 41×. The optimizations
for P3 (Figure 3b) and P7 (Figure 3d) work completely on
the encrypted data and do not expend the privacy budget.
Hence they do not hurt the program accuracy in any way.
Another observation is that for frequency counts the error
of Cryptϵ is around 2× higher than that of the corresponding
CDP implementation. This is intuitive because we add two
instances of Laplace noise in Cryptϵ (Section 6.2). For P1, the
CDP implementation also uses a range tree.
9.3 Performance Gain From Optimizations
In this section we evaluateQ2 by analysing howmuch speed-
up is brought about by the proposed optimizations in the
total program execution. The results are in Table 3.
DP Index: For P5, we observe from Table 3 that the unopti-
mized implementation takes around 20 minutes to run. How-
ever a DP index over the attribute NativeCountry reduces
the execution time to about 30s giving us a 41× speed-up.
Table 3: ExecutionTimeAnalysis forCryptϵ Programs
Time in (s) Program
1 3 5 7
Unoptimized Cryptϵ
AS 1756.71 6888.23 650.78 290
CSP 0.26 6764.64 550.34 30407.73
Total 1756.97 13652.87 1201.12 30697.73
Cryptϵ Total 0.31 13.9 29.21 299.5Speed Up × 5667.64 982.2 41.1 102.49
It is so because, only about 2% of the data records satisfy
NativeCountry=Mexico. Thus the index drastically reduces
the number of records to be processed for the program.
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Figure 4: Accuracy and performance of P5 at different
settings of DP index optimization
Additionally we study the dependency of the accuracy and
execution time of P5 implemented with DP index on three
parameters – (a) fraction of privacy budget, ρ used for build-
ing the DP index (b) total number of domain partitions(bins)
used for constructing the DP index (c) number of neighboring
bins considered for executing P5. The default configuration
for Cryptϵ presented in this section uses ϵ = 2.2, ρ = 0.2,
total 10 bins and considers no extra neighboring bin.
In Figure 4a and 4b we study how the mean error and
execution time of the final result vary as a function of ρ for P5.
From Figure 4a we observe that the mean error drops sharply
from ρ = 0.1 to ρ = 0.2, stabilises till ρ = 0.5 and starts
increasing again. This is so because, at ρ = 0.2, the noisy
index correctly identifies almost all the records satisfying
the Filter condition. However as we keep increasing ρ, the
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privacy budget left for the program after Filter (the Laplace
operator) keeps decreasing which results in higher error
in the final answer. From Figure 4b, we observe that the
execution time increases till ρ = 0.5 and then stabilizes; the
reason is that the total number of rows returned after ρ = 0.5
does not differ by much.
We plot the mean error and execution time for P5 by
varying the total number of bins from 2 to 40 (domain size
of NativeCountry is 40) in Figure 4c and 4d respectively.
From Figure 4c, we observe that the error of P5 increases
as the number of bins increase. It is so because from the
computation of the prefix counts (Section 8.1), the amount of
noise added increases with k (as noise is drawn from Lap(kϵ )).
Figure 4d shows that the execution time decreases with k .
This is intuitive because increase in k results in smaller bins,
hence the number of rows included in [is , ie ] decreases.
To avoid missing relevant rows, more bins that are adja-
cent to the chosen range [is , ie ] can be considered for the
subsequent operators. Thus, as the number of bins considered
increases, the resulting error decreases at the cost of higher
execution time. The experimental results are presented in
Figure 7a and Figure 7b in Appendix F).
DP Range Tree: For P1 we see from Table 3 that the total
execution time of the unoptimized Cryptϵ implementation
is about half an hour. However, using the range tree opti-
mization reduces the execution time by 5667×. The reason
behind this huge speed-up is that the time required by the AS
in the optimized implementation becomes almost negligible
because it simply needs to do a memory fetch to read off the
answer from the pre-computed range tree.
Pre-computation: For P3 the unoptimized execution time
on the dataset of 32561 records is around 4 hours (Table 3).
This is so because the CrossProduct operator has to perform
10 · 32561 labMult operations which is very time consuming.
Hence, pre-computing the one-hot-codings for 2-D attribute
over Race and Gender is very useful; the execution time
reduces to less than a minute giving us a 982.2× speed up.
Offline Processing: The most costly operator for P7 is the
GroupByCountEncoded operator since the CSP has to gen-
erate 3, 256, 200 ciphertexts of 0 and 1 for the encrypted
one-hot-codings. This results in a total execution time of
about 8.5 hours in unoptimized Cryptϵ . However, by gen-
erating the ciphertexts off-line, the execution time can be
reduced to just 5 minutes giving us a speed up of 102.49×.
Another important observation from Table 3 is that the
AS performs the major chunk of the work for most program
executions. This conforms with our discussion in Section 2.2.
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Figure 5: Scalability of Cryptϵ Programs
9.4 Scalability
In this section we evaluate Q3 by observing the execution
times of the aforementioned four Cryptϵ programs for dataset
sizes up to 1 million. As seen from Figure 5, the longest ex-
ecution time (P7) for a dataset of 1 million records is 3.6
hours; this showcases the practical scalability of Cryptϵ . All
the reported execution times are for default setting. For P1
we see that the the execution time does not change with
the dataset size. This is so because once the range tree is
constructed, the program execution just involves reading the
answer directly from the tree followed by a decryption by
the CSP. The execution time for the P3 and P7 is dominated
by the ⊕ operation for the GroupByCount operator. The
cost of ⊕ is linear to the data size, hence the execution time
for P3 and P7 increases linearly with the data size. For P5,
the execution time depends on the % of the records in the
dataset that satisfy the condition NativeCountry = Mexico
(roughly this many rows are retrieved from the noisy index).
10 EXTENSION OF CRYPTϵ IN THE
MALICIOUS MODEL
In this section, we briefly discuss how to extend the cur-
rent Cryptϵ system to account for a malicious adversary.
We present one approach for the extension and detail an-
other approach in Appendix C.The first approach imple-
ments the CSP inside a trusted execution environment (TEE)
[10, 20, 83]. This ensures non-collusion (as the CSP cannot
collude with the AS since all its operations are vetted). The
measurement operators are implemented as follows (the pri-
vacy budget over-expenditure checking remains unchanged
from that in Section 6 and we skip re-describing it here).
LaplaceLapϵ,∆(V \c): The new implementation requires only
a single instance of noise addition by the CSP. The AS sends
the ciphertext c to the CSP. The CSP decrypts the cipher-
text, adds a copy of noise η ∼ Lap( 2·∆ϵ ) and sends it to the AS.
NoisyMaxNoisyMaxkϵ,∆(V): The new implementationworks
without the garbled circuit as follows. The AS sends the vec-
tor of ciphertexts V to the CSP. The CSP computes V˜ [i] =
labDecryptsk (V [i])+η[i], i ∈ [|V |] ,whereη[i] ∼ Lap(2k∆/ϵ)
and outputs the indices of the top k values of V˜ .
Malicious AS: Recall that a Cryptϵ program P consists of
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a series of transformation operators that transforms the en-
crypted database D˜ to a ciphertext c (or an encrypted vector
V ). This is followed by applying a measurement operator on
c (or V ). Let P1 represent the first part of the program P up
to the computation of c and let P2 represent the subsequent
measurement operator (performed by the CSP inside a TEE).
In the malicious model, the AS is motivated to misbehave. For
example, instead of submitting the correct cipher c = P1(D˜)
the AS could run a different program P ′ on the record of
a single data owner only. Such malicious behaviour can be
prevented by having the CSP validate the AS’s work via
zero knowledge proofs (ZKP) [86] as follows (similar proof
structure as prior work [84]). Specifically, the ZKP statement
should prove that the AS 1) runs the correct program P1 2)
on the correct dataset D˜. For this, the CSP shares a random
one-time MAC key,mki , i ∈ [m] with each of the data own-
ers, DOi . Along with the encrypted record D˜i , DOi sends a
Pedersen commitment [88] Comi to the one-time MAC [65]
on D˜i and a short ZKP that the opening of this commitment
is a valid one-time MAC on D˜i . The AS collects all the ci-
phertexts and proofs from the data owners and computes
c = P1(D˜1, · · · , D˜m). Additionally, it constructs a ZKP that c
is indeed the output of executing P1 on D˜ = {D˜1, · · · , D˜m}
[24]. Formally, the proof statement is
c = P1(D˜1, · · · , D˜m) ∧ ∀i Open(Comi ) = MACmki (D˜i ) (2)
The AS submits the ciphertext c along with all the commit-
ments and proofs to the CSP. By validating the proofs, the
CSP can guarantee c is indeed the desired ciphertext. The
one-time MACs ensure that the AS did not modify or drop
any of the records received from the data owners.
Efficient proof construction: Our setting suits that of des-
ignated verifier non-interactive zero knowledge (DV NIZK)
proofs [26]. In a DV NIZK setting, the proofs can be verified
by a single designated entity (as opposed to publicly verifi-
able proofs [53]) who possesses some secret key for the NIZK
system. Thus in Cryptϵ , clearly the CSP can assume the role
of the designated verifier. The framework for efficient DV
NIZKs proposed by Chaidos and Couteau [26] can be ap-
plied to prove Eq. (2), as this framework enables proving
arbitrary relations between cryptographic primitives, such
as Pedersen commitment or Paillier encryption. A detailed
construction is given in Appendix Cwhich shows that all
the steps of the proof involve simple arithmetic operations
modulo N 2 where N is a RSA modulus. To get an idea of
the execution overhead for the ZKPs, consider constructing
a DV NIZK for proving that a Paillier ciphertext encrypts
the products of the plaintexts of two other ciphertexts (this
could be useful for proving the validity of our Filter operator,
for example). In [26], this involves 4loдN bits of communica-
tion and the operations involve addition and multiplication
of group elements. Each such operation takes order of 10−5
seconds to execute, hence for proving the above statement
for 1 million ciphertexts will take only a few tens of seconds.
Malicious CSP: Recall that our extension implements the
CSP inside a TEE. Hence this ensures that the validity of each
of CSP’s actions can be attested to by the data owners in a
TEE. Since, the measurement operators (P2) are changed to
be implemented completely inside the CSP, this guarantees
the bounded ϵ-DP guarantee of Cryptϵ programs even under
the malicious model. Additionally sending the CSP the true
ciphers c = P1(D˜) also does not cause any privacy violation
as it is decrypted inside the TEE.
Validity of the data owner’s records: The validity of the
one-hot-coding of the data records D˜i submitted by the data
owners DOi can be checked as follows. Let D˜i j represent
the encrypted value for attribute Aj in one-hot-coding for
DOi . The AS selects a set of random numbers R = {rk | k ∈
[|domain(Aj )|]} and computes the set Pi j = {labMult(D˜i j [k],
labEncpk (rk ))}. Then it sends sets Pi j and R to the CSP who
validates the record only if |Pi j ∩ R | = 1∀Aj . Note that since
the CSP does not have access to the index information of Pi j
and R (since they are sets), it cannot learn the value of Di j .
Alternatively each data owner can provide a zero knowledge
proof for ∀j,k, Di j [k] ∈ {0, 1} ∧∑k Di j [k] = 1.
11 RELATEDWORK
Differential Privacy: Introduced by Dwork et al. in [38],
differential privacy has enjoyed immense attention from both
academia and industry in the last decade. Interesting work
has been done in both theCDPmodel [8, 22, 30, 33, 34, 39, 54–
56, 58, 70, 71, 75, 85, 89, 90, 100–102, 104, 105, 107] and the
LDP model [13, 32, 42, 44, 91, 95–97, 108]. Recently, it has
been showed that augmenting the LDP setting by a layer
of anonymity improves the privacy guarantees [20, 31, 41].
It is important to note that the power of this new model
(known as shuffler/mixnet model) lies strictly between that
of LDP and CDP. Cryptϵ differs from this line of work in
three ways, namely expressibility, precise DP guarantee and
trust assumptions (details are in the Appendix ?? ).
Two-ServerModel: The two-servermodel is popularly used
for privacy preserving machine learning approaches where
one of the servers manages the cryptographic primitives
while the other handles computation [46, 48, 67, 80, 83, 84].
Homomorphic Encryption: Recently, there has been a
surge in privacy preserving solutions using homomorphic en-
cryptions due to improved primitives. A lot of the aforemen-
tioned two-server models employ homomorphic encryption
[48, 67, 83, 84]. Additionally it is used in [23, 25, 49, 50, 60].
12 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed a system and programming
framework, Cryptϵ , for differential privacy that achieves the
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constant accuracy guarantee and algorithmic expressibility
of CDP without any trusted server. This is achieved via two
non-colluding servers with the assistance of cryptographic
primitives, specifically LHE and garbled circuits. Our pro-
posed system Cryptϵ can execute a rich class of programs
that can run efficiently by virtue of four optimizations.
Recall that currently the data analyst spells out the explicit
Cryptϵ program to the AS. Thus an important future work is
constructing a compiler for Cryptϵ that takes as input only
a user specified query in a high-level-language and a pri-
vacy budget. The compiler should then be able to formalize
an optimized Cryptϵ program expressed in terms of Cryptϵ
operators with automated sensitivity analysis. Another di-
rection is to support a larger class of programs in Cryptϵ .
For example, inclusion of aggregation operators such as sum,
median, average should be easily achievable. Support for
multi-table queries like joins would require protocols for
computing sensitivity [62] and data truncation [68].
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A BACKGROUND CNTD.
The stability of a transformation operation is defined as
Definition 2. A transformation T is defined to be t-stable
if for two datasets D and D ′, we have
|T (D) ⊖ T (D ′)| ≤ t · |D ⊖ D ′ | (3)
where (i.e., D ⊖ D ′ = (D − D ′) ∪ (D ′ − D).
Transformations with bounded stability scale the DP guar-
antee of their outputs, by their stability constant [77].
Theorem 6. If T is an arbitrary t-stable transformation on
datasetD andA is an ϵ-DP algorithm which takes output of T
as input, the composite computationA ◦T provides (ϵ · t)-DP.
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption(labHE). Let (Gen,
Enc,Dec) be an LHE scheme with security parameter κ and
message spaceM. Assume that a multiplication operation
exists inM, i.e., is a finite ring. Let F : {0, 1}s × L → M
be a pseudo-random function with seed space {0, 1}s ( s=
poly(κ)) and the label space L. A labHE scheme is defined
as
• labGen(κ) : Runs Gen(κ) and outputs (sk,pk).
• localGen(pk) : For each user i and with the public key
as input, it samples a random seed σi ∈ {0, 1}s and com-
putes pki = Encpk (σi ) where σi is an encoding of σi as an
element ofM. It outputs (σi ,pki ).
• labEncpk (σi ,m,τ ) : On input a message m ∈ M with
label τ ∈ L from user i , it computes b = F (σi ,τ ) (mask)
and outputs the labeled ciphertext c = (a,d) ∈ M × C
with a =m − b (hidden message) inM and d = Encpk (b).
For brevity we just use notation labEncpk (m) to denote
the above functionality, in the rest of paper.
• labDecsk (c) : This functions inputs a cipher c = (a,d) ∈
M × C and decrypts it asm = a − Decsk (d).
• labMult(c1, c2) - On input two labHE ciphers c1 = (a1,d1)
and c2 = (a2,d2), it computes a "multiplication" ciphertext
e = labMult(c1, c2) = Encpk (a1,a2) ⊕ cMult(d1,a2) ⊕
cMult(d2,a1). Observe that Decsk (e) =m1 ·m2 − b1 · b2.
• labMultDecsk (d1,d2, e) - On input two encrypted masks
d1,d2 of two labHE ciphers c1, c2, this algorithm decryts
the output e of labMult(c1, c2) asm3 = Decsk (e)+Decsk (d1)·
Decsk (d2) which is equals tom1 ·m2.
B SECURITY PROOF
In this section we present the formal proof for Theorem 3.
Proof. We have nine operators in our paper (see Table 1).
• NoisyMax and CountDistinct use “standard” garbled
circuit construction and their security proof follows
from the proof of these schemes.
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Table 4: Comparative analysis of different DP models
Features LDP CDP Cryptϵ
# Centralized Servers 1 1 2
Trust Assumption Untrusted
for Centralized Untrusted Trusted Semi Honest
Server Non-Colluding
Data Storage N/A Clear Encryptedin Server
Adversary Information Information ComputationallyTheoretic Theoretic Bounded
Error on Statistical Counting Query O
(√(n)
ϵ
)
O
(
1
ϵ
)
O
(
1
ϵ
)
• All other operators except Laplace essentially use ho-
momorphic properties of our encryption scheme and
thus there security follows from semantic-security of
these scheme.
• The proof for the Laplace operator is given below.
The proof for an entire program P (which is a composition of
these operators) follows from the composition theorem [86,
Section 7.3.1]
We will prove the theorem for the Laplace operator. In
this case the views are as follows (the outputs of the two
parties can simply computed from the views):
ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵ) = (pk, D˜,η1, P(D) + η2 + η1)
ViewΠ2 (pk, sk, P ,D, ϵ) = (η2, labEncpk (P(D) + η1))
The random variables η1 and η2 are random variables gen-
erated according to the Laplace distribution Lap( 2·∆ϵ ) where
∆ is the program sensitivity (computed w.r.t Definition 1).
The simulators Sim1(zB1 ) (where z1 = (y1, |D|) is the random
variable distributed according to PCDPB (D, ϵ)), y1 being the
random variable distributed as PCDP (D, ϵ/2)) performs the
following steps:
• Generates a pair of keys (pk1, sk1) for the encryption
scheme and generates random data setD1 of the same
size as D and encrypts it using pk1 to get D˜1.
• Generates η′1 according to the Laplace distribution
Lap( 2·∆ϵ ).
The output of Sim1(z1) is (D˜1,η′1,y1+η′1). Recall that the view
of the AS is (D˜,η1, P(D)+η2 +η1). The computational indis-
tinguishability of D˜1 and D˜ follows from the semantic secu-
rity of the encryption scheme. The tuple (η′1,y1 +η′1) has the
same distribution as (η1, P(D)+η2+η1) and hence the tuples
are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, Sim1(z1)
is computational indistinguishable from ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵ).
The simulators Sim2(z2) (where z2 = (y2, |D|) is the ran-
dom variable distributed according to PCDPB (D, ϵ)), y2 being
the random variable distributed as PCDP (D, ϵ/2)) performs
the following steps:
• Generates a pair of keys (pk2, sk2) for our encryption
scheme.
• Generates η′2 according to the Laplace distribution
Lap( 2·∆ϵ ).
The output of Sim2(z2) is (η′2, labEncpk (y2) + η′2). By simi-
lar argument as before Sim2(z2) is computationally indistin-
guishable from ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵ). □
C EXTENSION TO MALICIOUS MODEL
CNTD.
C.1 First Approach Cntd.
Efficient proof construction: Here we will outline an effi-
cient construction for the aforementioned proof. First note
that our setting suits that of designated verifier non-interactive
zero knowledge (DV NIZK) proofs. In a DV NIZK setting,
the proofs can be verified by a single designated entity (as
opposed to publicly verifiable proofs) who possesses some
secret key for the NIZK system. Thus in Cryptϵ , clearly the
CSP can assume the role of the designated verifier. This re-
laxation of public verifiability leads to boast in efficiency for
the proof system.
The authors in [26] present a framework for efficient DV
NIZKs for a group-dependent language L where the abelian
group L is initiated on is of order N and ZN is the plaintext-
space of an homomorphic cryptosystem. In other words,
this framework enables proving arbitrary relations between
cryptographic primitives such as Pedersen commitments
or Paillier encryptions via DV NIZK proofs, in an efficient
way. In what follows, we show that the proof statement
given by eq (2) falls in the language L and consists of simple
arithmetic computations.
The construction of the proof works as follows. First the
AS creates linearly homomorphic commitments (we use Ped-
erson commitments) Comei on the encrypted data records
D˜i and proves that Comc = P1(Come1 , . . . ,Comem) where
Open(Comc ) = c. This is possible because of the homomor-
phic property of the Pederson commitment scheme; all the
operations in P1 can be applied to {Comei } instead. We use
Paillier encryption scheme [87] for our prototype Cryptϵ con-
struction and hence base the rest of the discussion on it. Pail-
lier ciphertexts are elements in the group (Z/N 2Z)∗ where
N is an RSA modulus. Pedersen commitments to such values
can be computed as Com = дxhr ∈ F∗p , 0 ≤ r < N 2,д,h ∈
F∗p , Order(д) = Order(h) = N 2,p is a prime such that p =
1mod N 2. This allows us to prove arithmetic relations on
committed values modulo N 2. Finally, the AS just needs to
show thatComi opens to a MAC of the opening ofComei . For
this, the MACs we use are built from linear hash functions
H (x) = ax +b [84] where the MAC signing key is the pair of
random values (a,b) ∈ (Z/N 2Z). Proving to the CSP that the
opening of Comi is a valid MAC on the opening of Comei is
a simple proof of arithmetic relations. Thus, quite evidently
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an efficient DV NIZK proof for eq (2) can be supported by
the framework in [26]. To get an idea of the execution over-
head for the ZKPs, consider constructing a DV NIZK for
proving that a Paillier ciphertext encrypts the products of
the plaintexts of two other ciphertexts requires (this could
be useful for proving the validity of our Filter operator). In
the framework proposed in in [26], this involves 4loдN bits
of communication and the operations involve addition and
multiplication of group elements. Each such operation takes
O(10−5)s execution time, hence for proving the above state-
ment for 1 mil ciphers will take only a few tens of seconds.
C.2 Second Approach
In this section, we describe the second approach to extend
Cryptϵ to account for a malicious adversary. For this we
propose the following changes to the implementation of the
measurement operator.
Laplace Lap∆,ϵ (c\V ): Instead of having both the servers, AS
and CSP add two separate instances of Laplace noise to the
true answer, single instance of the Laplace noise is jointly
computed via a SMC protocol [37, 81] as follows. First the AS
adds a random maskM to the encrypted input c to generate
cˆ and sends it to the CSP. Next the CSP generates a garbled
circuit that 1) inputs two random bit strings S1 and R1 from
the AS 2) inputs another pair of random strings S2 and R2
and a maskM ′ from the CSP 3) uses S1 and S2 to generate an
instance of random noise, η ∼ Lap( 2·∆ϵ ) using the fundamen-
tal law of transformation of probabilities 4) uses R1 ⊕ R2 as
the randomness for generating a Pedersen commitment for
M ′,Com(M ′) 4) outputs c˜′ = cˆ+labEncpk (η)+labEncpk (M ′),
Com(M ′), and labEncpk (r ) (r is the randomness used for gen-
erating Com(M ′)). The CSP sends this circuit to the AS who
evaluates the circuit and sends c˜′,Com(M ′), and labEncpk (r )
back to the CSP. Now, the CSP decrypts c˜′ and subtracts the
maskM ′ to return c˜ ′ = labDecsk (c˜′) −M ′ to the AS. Finally
the AS can subtract outM to compute the answer c˜ = c˜ ′−M .
Note that one can create an alternative circuit to the one
given above which decrypts c˜ inside the circuit. However,
decrypting Pailler ciphertexts inside the garbled circuit is
costly. The circuit design given above hence results in a sim-
pler circuit at the cost of an extra round of communication.
NoisyMaxNoisyMaxkϵ,∆(·): TheAS sends amasked encrypted
vector, Vˆ to the CSP Vˆ [i] = V [i] +M[i], i ∈ [|V |]. The CSP
generates a garbled circuit that 1) inputs the mask vector
M , a vector of random strings S1, a random number r and
its ciphertext cr = labEncpk (r ) from the AS 2) inputs the
secret key sk and another vector of random strings S2 the
from the CSP 3) checks if labDecsk (cr) == r , proceed to
the next steps only if the check succeeds else return −1 4)
uses S1 and S2 to generate a vector η[i] ∼ Lap( 2·k ·∆ϵ ) using
the fundamental law of transformation of probabilities 5)
computes V [i] = labDecsk (Vˆ [i]) + η[i] − M[i] 6) finds the
indices of the top k highest values of V and outputs them.
The CSP sends this circuit to the AS who evaluates it to get
the answer. Note that here we are forced to decrypt Paillier
ciphertexts inside the circuit because in order to ensure DP
in the Noisy-Max algorithm, the noisy intermediate counts
cannot be revealed.
Malicious AS: Recall that a Cryptϵ program P consists of
a series of transformation operators that transforms the en-
crypted database D˜ to a ciphertext c (or a vector of cipher-
texts V ). This is followed by applying a measurement opera-
tor on c (V ). Additionally, as shown in the above discussion,
in the very first step of the measurement operators the AS
adds a mask to c and sends the masked ciphertext cˆ = c +M
to the CSP. For a given program P , let P1 represent first part
of the program up till the computation of c (V ). The zero
knowledge proof structure is very similar to the one dis-
cussed in Section 7.2 except for the following changes. Now
the CSP sends a one-time MAC key kAS to the AS as well
and the AS sends the masked ciphertext cˆ(or Vˆ ), along with
the commitments and zero knowledge proofs from the data
owners and an additional commitment to the one-time MAC
on the maskM , ComAS and a proof for the statement
c = P1(D˜1, · · · , D˜m) ∧ ∀i Open(Comi ) = MACmki (D˜i )
∧ cˆ = c + labEncpk (M) ∧ Open(ComAS ) = MACkAS (M)
The CSP proceeds with the rest of the computation only if it
can validate the above proof. As long as one of the bit strings
(or vectors of bit strings) in {S1, S2} (and {R2,R2} in case of
the Laplace operator) is generated truly at random (in this
case the honest CSP will generate truly random strings), the
garbled circuits for the subsequent measurement operators
will add the correct Laplace noise. Additionally, the maskM ′
prevents the AS from cheating in the last round of communi-
cation with the CSP in the protocol. It is so because, if the AS
does not submit the correct ciphertext to the CSP in the last
round, it will get back garbage values (thereby thwarting any
privacy leakage). Hence, this prevents a malicious AS from
cheating during any Cryptϵ program execution. Note that
the construction of the ZKP is similar to the one discussed
in Section 7.2 and can be done efficiently via the framework
in [26].
Malicious CSP: As discussed in Section 3, the CSP main-
tains a public ledger with the following information
(1) total privacy budget ϵB which is publicly known
(2) the privacy budget ϵ used up every time the AS submits
a ciphertext for decryption
Since the ledger is public, the AS can verify whether the per
program reported privacy budget is correct preventing any
disparities in the privacy budget allocation.
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Recall that the CSP receives a masked cipher cˆ from the
AS at the beginning of the measurement operators. The mask
M protects the value of c from the CSP. We discuss the set-
ting of a malicious CSP separately for the two measurement
operators as follows.
Laplace: In case of the Laplace operator, a malicious CSP
can cheat by 1) the generated garbled circuit does not corre-
spond to the correct functionality 2) reports back incorrect
decryption results. The correctness of the garbled circuit
can be checked by standard mechanisms [98] where the AS
specifically checks that a) the circuit functionality is correct
b) the circuit uses the correct value for cˆ. For the second case,
the CSP provides the AS with a zero knowledge proof for
the following statement
Open(Com(M ′), r ) = labDecsk (c˜ ′) − c˜ ′
NoisyMax: The garbled circuit for the NoisyMax operator
is validated similarly by standard mechanisms [98] where
the AS checks a) whether the circuit implements the correct
functionality b) the correct value of Vˆ is used. Note that the
equality check of step (3) in the circuit validates if the CSP
has provided the correct secret key sk thereby forcing it to
decrypt the ciphertexts correctly.
Note that certain operators like CrossProduct, GroupBy-
Count* and CountDistinct the involve interactions with the
CSP as well but their validity can also be proven by standard
techniques similar to the ones discussed above. Specifically
CrossProduct and GroupByCount* can use zero knowledge
proof in the framework [26] while the garbled circuit in
CountDistinct can use [98].
D ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
DETAILS
D.1 General n-way Multiplication for
labHE
The labMult() operator of a labHE scheme allows the multi-
plication of two ciphers. However, it cannot be used directly
for a n-way muplication where n > 2. It is so because the
"multiplication" cipher e = labMult(c1, c2) does not have a
corresponding label, i.e., it is not in the correct labHE cipher
representation. Hence we propose Algorithm 1 to generate a
label τ ′ and a seed b ′ for every intermediary product of two
multiplicands so that it we can do a generic n-way multiplica-
tion on the ciphers. Note that the mask r protects the value of
(m1 ·m2) from theCSP (Step 3) andb ′ hides (m1 ·m2) from the
AS (Step 6). For example, suppose we want to multiply the
respective ciphers of 4 messages {m1,m2,m3,m4} ∈ M4 and
obtain e = labEncpk (m1 ·m2 ·m3 ·m4). For this, theAS first gen-
erates e1,2 = labEncpk (m1 ·m2) and e3,4 = labEncpk (m3 ·m4)
using Algorithm 1. Both operations can be done in parallel
in just one interaction round between the AS and the CSP.
In the next round, the AS can again use Algorithm 1 with
inputs e1,2 and e3,4 to obtain the final answer e. Thus for a
generic n −way multiplication the order of multiplication
can be, in fact, parallelized as shown in Figure 6 to require a
total of ⌈logn⌉ rounds of communication with the CSP.
D.2 Operator Implementation
CrossProduct ×Ai ,Aj→A′(·): This operator replaces the two
attributes Ai and Aj by a single attribute A′. Given the en-
crypted input table T˜ , where all attributes are in one-hot-
encoding and encrypted, the attributes of T˜ except Ai and
Aj remain the same. For every row in T˜ , we denote the en-
crypted one-hot-encoding for Ai and Aj by v˜1 and v˜2. Let s1
and s2 be the domain sizes of Ai and Aj respectively. Then
the new one-hot-encoding for A′, denoted by v˜, has a length
of s = s1 · s2. For l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}, we have
v˜[l] = labMult(v˜1[l/s2], v˜2[l%s2]).
Only one bit in v˜ forA′will be encrypted 1 and the others will
be encrypted 0s. When merging more than two attributes,
Cryptϵ can use the дenLabMult() described in Section 6.1 to
speed up computation.
Project πA¯(·): The implementation of this operator simply
drops off all but the attributes in A¯ from the input table T˜
and returns the truncated table T˜ ′.
Filter σϕ (·): The predicate ϕ in this operator is a conjunction
of range conditions over A¯, defined as: for a row r in input
table T˜ , ϕ(r ) = ∧Aj ∈A¯ (r .Aj ∈ VAj ), where r .Aj is the value
of attributeAj in row r andVAj ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , sAj } (the indices
for attribute values of Aj with domain size sAj ).
Algorithm 1 дenLabMult - generate label for labMult
Input: c1 = (a1,d1) = labEncpk (m1) and c2 = labEncpk (m2)
where a1 = m1 − b1,d1 = Encpk (b1), a2 = m2 − b2,d2 =
Encpk (b2)
Output: e = labEncpk (m1 ·m2)
AS:
1: Computes e′ = labMult(c1, c2)⊕Encpk (r )where r is a random
mask
//e ′ corresponds tom1 ·m2 − b1 · b2 + r
2: Sends e′,d1,d2 to CSP
CSP:
3: Computes e ′′ = Decsk (e′) + Decsk (d1) · Decsk (d2)
//e ′′ corresponds tom1 ·m2 + r
4: Picks a seed σ ′ and label τ ′ and computes b ′ = F (σ ′,τ ′)
5: Sends e¯ = (a¯,d ′) to AS, where a¯ = e ′′ − b ′ and d ′ = Encpk (b ′)
//a¯ corresponds tom1 ·m2 + r − b ′.
AS:
6: Computes true cipher e = (a′,d ′) where a′ = a¯ − r
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First, we will show how to evaluate whether a row r satis-
fies r .Aj ∈ VAj . Let v˜j be the encrypted one-hot-encoding of
Aj , then the indicator function can be computed as
Ir .Aj ∈VAj =
⊕
l ∈VAj
v˜j [l].
If the attribute of Aj in r has a value in VAj , then Ir .Aj ∈VAj
equals 1; otherwise, 0.
Next, we canmultiply all the indicators usingдenLabMult()
(Section 6.1) to check whether all attributes in Aj ∈ A¯ of r
satisfy the conditions in ϕ. Let A¯ = {A1, . . . ,Am}, then
ϕ(r ) = дenLabMult(IA1∈VA1 , . . . , IAm ∈VAm ).
Last, we update the bit of r inB, i.e.,B′[i] = labMult(B[i],ϕ(r )),
given r is the ith row in the input table. This step zeros out
some additional records which were found to be extraneous
by some preceding filter conditions.
Note that when the Filter transformation is applied for the
very first time in a Cryptϵ program and the input predicate
is conditioned on a single attribute A ∈ VA, we can directly
compute the new bit vector using Ir .A∈VA , i.e., for the ith
record r in input table T˜ , we have B′[i] =⊕l ∈VA v˜j [l]. This
avoids the unnecessary multiplication labMult(B[i],ϕ(r )).
Count count(·): To evaluate this operator on its input table
T˜ , Cryptϵ simply adds up the bits in the corresponding B,
i.e.,
⊕m
i B[i].
GroupByCount γ countA (·): The implementation steps for
Project, Filter andCount are reused here. First, Cryptϵ projects
the input table T˜ on attributeA, i.e. T˜ 1 = πA(T˜ ). Then, Cryptϵ
loops each possible value of A. For each value v , Cryptϵ ini-
tializes a temporary Bv = B and filters T˜
′ on A = v to get an
updated B′v . Last, Cryptϵ counts the number of 1s in B′v and
release the counts.
GroupByCountEncodedγ countA (·): The implementation de-
tail of this operator is given by Algorithm 2.
CountDistinct countD(·): The implementation of this oper-
ator involves both AS and CSP. Given the input encrypted
vector of counts V of length s , the AS first masks V to form
a new encrypted vectorV with a vector of random numbers
M , i.e., for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s−1},V[i] = V [i]⊕labEncpk (M[i]).
This masked encrypted vector is then sent to CSP and de-
crypted by CSP to a plaintext vector V using the secret
key.
Next, CSP generates a garbled circuit which takes (i) the
mask M from the AS, and (ii) the plaintext masked vector
V and a random number r from the CSP as the input. This
circuit first removes the maskM fromV to get V and then
counts the number of non-zero entries in V , denoted by c .
A masked count c ′ = c + r is outputted by this circuit. CSP
send both the circuit and the encrypted random number
labEncpk (r ) to AS.
Last, the AS evaluates this circuit to the masked count c ′
and obtains the final output to this operator: c = labEncpk (c ′)−
labEncpk (r ).
Laplace Lapϵ,∆(V): The implementation of this operator is
presented in the main paper in sec 5.2.
NoisyMax NoisyMaxkϵ,∆(·): The input to this operator is an
encrypted vector of counts V of size s . Similar to Laplace
operator, both AS and CSP are involved. First, the AS adds to
V an encrypted Laplace noise vector and a maskM , i.e., for
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s}, Vˆ [i] = V [i] ⊕ labEncpk (ηi ) ⊕ M[i], where
ηi ∼ Lap(2 · k · ∆/ϵ). This encrypted noisy, masked vector Vˆ
is then sent to the CSP.
The CSP first checks whether
∑t
i=1 ϵi + ϵ ≤ ϵB where ϵi
represents the privacy budget used for a previously executed
program Pi (we presume that a total of t ∈ N programs have
been executed hitherto the details of which are logged into
the CSP’s public ledger). Only in the event the above check
is satisfied, the CSP proceeds to decrypt Vˆ using the secret
key, i.e., for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s}, Vˆ [i] = labDecsk (Vˆ [i]). Next the
CSP records ϵ and the current program details in the public
ledger. This is followed by the CSP adding another round of
Laplace noise to generate Vˆ ′[i] = Vˆ [i] ⊕ labEncpk (η′i ),where
η′i ∼ Lap(2 · k · ∆/ϵ), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s}. (This is to ensure that
as long as one of the parties is semi-honest, the output does
not violate DP.) Finally, the CSP generates a garbled circuit
which takes (i) the noisy, masked vector Vˆ from the CSP,
and (ii) the mask M from the AS as the input. This circuit
will remove the mask from Vˆ to get the noisy counts Vˆ ′ and
find the indices of the top-k values in Vˆ ′.
Finally, the AS evaluates the circuit above and returns the
indices as the output of this operator.
D.3 DP Index Optimization Cntd.
Lemma 5. Let P be the program that computes the map-
ping F . Let Π be the protocol corresponding to the construc-
tion of the DP index in Cryptϵ . The views and outputs of AS
and CSP are denoted follows:
ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA) OutputΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA)
ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA) OutputΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA)
There exists Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) simulators
Sim1 and Sim2 such that:
• Sim1(PCDPB (D, ϵA)) is computationally indistinguishable
(≡c ) from (ViewΠ1 (P ,D, ϵA),OutputΠ(D, ϵA)), and
• Sim2(PCDPB (D, ϵA)) is≡c to (ViewΠ2 (P ,D, ϵA),OutputΠ(D, ϵ)).
OutputΠ(P ,D, ϵA)) is the combined output of the two parties
Proof. Recall that protocol Π consists of two parts; in the
first part Π1, the AS obtains the sorted encrypted database
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Figure 6: дenLabMult() - Batching of multiplicands for
labHE
D˜s via a garbled circuit. Next Π2 computes F via a Cryptϵ
program. The security of the garbled circuit in Π1 follows
from standard approaches [74]. Hence in this section we
concentrate on Π2. The proof of the entire protocol Π follows
from the composition theorem [88,Section 7.3.1]. The views
of the servers for Π2 are as follows:
ViewΠ21 (P ,D, ϵA) = (pk, D˜, D˜s ,F )
ViewΠ22 (pk, sk, P ,D, ϵA) = (F )
The simulators Sim1(z1) (where z1 = (y1, |D|) is the random
variable distributed as PCDPB (D, ϵA), y1 being the random
variable distributed as PCDP (D, ϵA/2)) performs the follow-
ing steps:
(1) Generates a pair of keys (pk1, sk1) for the encryption
scheme and generates random data setD1 of the same
size as D and encrypts it using pk1 to get D˜1
(2) Generates another random datasetD2 of the same size
and encrypts it with pk to get D˜2.
The computational indistinguishability of D˜1 and D˜ fol-
lows directly from the semantic security of the encryption
scheme. From the construction of the secure sorting algo-
rithm, it is evident that the records in D˜s cannot be as-
sociated back with the data owners by the AS. This along
with the semantic security of the encryption scheme ensures
that D˜2 and D˜s are computationally indistinguishable as
well. The tuples (pk1, D˜1, D˜2,y1) has the same distribution as
(pk, D˜, D˜s ,F ) and hence are computationally indistinguish-
able. Therefore, Sim1(z1) is computational indistinguishable
from ViewΠ21 (P ,D, ϵA).
For the simulator Sim2(z2) (where z2 = (y2, |D|) is the ran-
dom variable distributed according to PCDPB (D, ϵA), y2 being
the random variable distributed as PCDP (D, ϵA/2)), clearly
tuples (y2) and (F ) have identical distribution. Thus, Sim2(z2)
is also computationally indistinguishable from
ViewΠ22 (P ,D, ϵA) thereby concluding our proof. □
Algorithm 2 GroupByCountEncoded γ˜ countA (T˜)
Input: T˜
Output: V˜
AS:
1: Computes V = γ countA (T˜ ).
2: Masks the encrypted histogram V for attribute A as fol-
lows
V[i] = V[i] ⊕ labEncpk (M[i])
M[i] ∈R [m], i ∈ [|V |]
3: SendsV to CSP.
CSP:
4: DecryptsV asV[i] = labDecsk (V), i ∈ [|V |].
5: Converts each entry ofV to its corresponding one-hot-
coding and encrypts it, V˜[i] = labEncpk ( ˜V[i]), i ∈ [|V |]
6: Sends V˜ to AS.
AS:
7: Rotates every entry by its corresponding mask value to
obtain the desired encrypted one-hot-coding V˜ [i].
V˜ [i] = RiдhtRotate(V˜,M[i]), i ∈ [|V |]
E CLASSIFICATION OF CRYPTϵ
PROGRAMS
Cryptϵ programs are grouped into three classes based on the
number and type of interaction between the AS and the CSP.
Class I: Single Decrypt Interaction Programs
For releasing any result (noisy) in the clear, the AS needs to
interact at least once with the CSP (via the two measurement
operators) as the latter has exclusive access to the secret key.
Cryptϵ programs like P1, P2 and P3 (Table 2) that require
only a single interaction of this type fall in this class.
Class II: LabHEMultiplication Interaction Programs
Cryptϵ supports a n-way multiplication of ciphers for n > 2
as described in Section 6.1 which requires intermediate inter-
actions with the CSP. Thus all Cryptϵ programs that require
multiplication of more than two ciphers need interaction
with the CSP. Examples include P4 and P5 (Table 2).
Class III: Other Interaction Programs
The GroupByCountEncoded operator requires an interme-
diate interaction with the CSP. The CountDistinct operator
also uses a garbled circuit (details in Appendix D.2 ) and
hence requires interactions with the CSP. Therefore, any
program with the above two operators, like P6 and P7 (Ta-
ble 2), requires at least two rounds of interaction.
F ADDITIONAL EVALUATION
In this section we present some additional evaluation results
for Cryptϵ programs.
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Figure 7: Accuracy and performance of P5 with vary-
ing number of neighboring bins considered for the DP
index optimization
F.1 DP Index Analysis Cntd.
Here we discuss the effect of including neighboring bins
in the program execution. To avoid missing relevant rows,
more bins that are adjacent to the chosen range [is , ie ] can
be considered for the subsequent operators. We increase
the number of neighbouring bins from 0 to 8. As shown in
Figure 7a, the error decreases and all the relevant rows are
included when 4 neighbouring bins are considered. However,
the execution time naturally increases with extra neighbour-
ing bins as shown in Figure 7b.
F.2 Communication Costs
We use Paillier encryption scheme [87] in our prototype
Cryptϵ (Section 9.1). This means that each ciphertext is a
random number in the group (Z/N 2Z)∗ where N is a RSA
moduli. Thus sending an encrypted data record entails in
each data owner sending
∑
j |domain(Aj )|, where Aj is an
attribute of the database schema, such numbers to the AS.
Communication is also needed for the measurement oper-
ators and GroupByCountEncoded where the AS needs to
send a ciphertext (or a vector of ciphertexts) to the CSP. Ad-
ditionally operators like NoisyMax and CountDistinct need
a round of communication for the garbled circuit however
these circuits are simple and dataset size independent. The
most communication intensive operator is the CrossProduct
which requires loд2m (Appendix D.1) wherem is the dataset
size rounds of interactions. However, this can be done as
a part of pre-processing (Section and hence does not affect
the actual program execution time. Hence overall, Cryptϵ
programs are not communication intensive.
G RELATEDWORK
G.1 Differential Privacy
Introduced by Dwork et al. [38], differential privacy has
enjoyed immense attention from both academia and industry
in the last decade. We will discuss the recent directions in
two models of differential privacy: the centralized differential
privacy (CDP), and local differential privacy (LDP).
The CDP model assumes the presence of a trusted server
which can aggregate all users’ data before perturb the query
answers. This allows the design of a complex algorithm that
releases more accurate query answers than the basic DP
mechanisms. For example, an important line of work in the
CDP model has been towards proposing "derived" mecha-
nisms” [30] or "revised algorithms" [22] from basic DP mech-
anisms (like exponential mechanism, Laplace mechanism,
etc.). The design of these mechanisms leverages on specific
properties of the query and the data, resulting in a better
utility than the basic mechanisms. One such technique is
based on data partition and aggregation [8, 33, 58, 89, 90, 101,
102, 107] and is helpful in answering histogram queries. The
privacy guarantees of these mechanisms can be ensured via
the composition theorems and the post-processing property
of differential privacy [38]. We would like to build Cryptϵ
that can support many of these algorithms.
The notion of LDP and related ideas has been around
for a while [43, 64, 99]. Randomized response proposed by
Warner in 1960s [99] is one of the simplest LDP techniques.
The recent LDP research techniques [13, 42? ] focus on con-
structing a frequency oracle that estimates the frequency
of any value in the domain. However, when the domain
size is large, it might be computationally infeasible to con-
struct the histogram over the entire domain. To tackle this
challenge, specialized and efficient algorithms have been
proposed to compute heavy hitters [44, 96], frequent item-
sets [91, 97], and marginal tables [32, 108]. As the LDPmodel
does not require a trusted data curator, it enjoyed significant
industrial adoption, such as Google [42, 44], Apple [51], and
Samsung [82].
Recently it has been showed that augmenting randomized
response mechanism with an additional layer of anonymity
in the communication channel can improve the privacy guar-
antees. The first work to study this was PROCHLO [20]
implementation by Google. PROCHLO necessitates this in-
termediary to be trusted, this is implemented via trusted
hardware enclaves (Intel’s SGX). However, as showcased
by recent attacks [94], it is notoriously difficult to design a
truly secure hardware in practice. Motivated by PROCHLO,
the authors in [41], present a tight upper-bound on the
worst-case privacy loss. Formally, they show that any per-
mutation invariant algorithm satisfying ϵ-LDP will satisfy
O(ϵ
√
log( 1δ )
n ,δ )-CDP, where n is the data size. Cheu et al. [31]
demonstrate privacy amplification by the same factor for 1-
bit randomized response by using a mixnet architecture to
provide the anonymity. This work also proves another im-
portant result that the power of the mixnet model lies strictly
between those of the central and local models.
A parallel line of work involves efficient use of crypto-
graphic primitives for differentially private functionalities.
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Agarwal et al. [9] proposed an algorithm for computing his-
togram over encrypted data. Rastogi et al. [92] and Shi et
al. [93] proposed algorithms that allow an untrusted aggre-
gator to periodically estimate the sum of n users’ values in a
privacy preserving fashion.However, both schemes are irre-
silient to user failures. Chan et al. [29] tackled this issue by
constructing binary interval trees over the users.
G.2 Two-Server Model
The two-server model is a popular choice for privacy pre-
serving machine learning techniques. Researchers have pro-
posed privacy preserving ridge regression systems with the
help of a cryptographic service provider [46, 48, 84]. While
the authors in [46] use a hybrid multi-party computation
scheme with a secure inner product technique, Nikolaenko
et al. propose a hybrid approach in [84] by combining ho-
momorphic encryptions and Yao’s garbled circuits. Gascon
et al. [45] extended the results in [84] to include vertically
partitioned data and the authors in [48] solve the problem
using just linear homomorphic encryption. Zhang et al. in
[80] also propose secure machine learning protocols using
a privacy-preserving stochastic gradient descent method.
Their main contribution includes developing efficient algo-
rithms for secure arithmetic operations on shared decimal
numbers and proposing alternatives to non-linear functions
such as sigmoid and softmax tailored for MPC computations.
In [83] and [67] the authors solve the problem of privacy-
preserving matrix factorization. In both the papers, use a
hybrid approach combining homomorphic encryptions and
Yao’s garbled circuits for their solutions.
G.3 Homomorphic Encryption
With improvements made in implementation efficiency and
new constructions developed in the recent past, there has
been a surge in practicable privacy preserving solutions em-
ploying homomorphic encryptions. A lot of the aforemen-
tioned two-server models employ homomorphic encryption
[48, 67, 83, 84]. In [25, 50, 60] the authors enable neural net-
works to be applied to homomorphic-ally encrypted data.
Linear homomorphic encryption is used in [49] to enable
privacy-preserving machine learning for ensemble meth-
ods while uses fully-homomorphic encryption to approxi-
mate the coefficients of a logistic-regression model. [23] uses
somewhat- homomorphic encryption scheme to compute
the forecast prediction of consumer usage for smart grids.
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